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This thesis analyzes the factors contributing to the differing degrees of integration 
achieved by the Armenian and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The two case studies 
presented include a historical overview of these refugees in Lebanon, the international 
response to the refugee crisis, the legal status of the discussed refugees in Lebanon, and 
the evolution of refugee identity. The analysis of the case studies uses the conceptual 
framework of Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, who wrote “Understanding Integration,” 
which appeared in the June 2008 Journal of Refugee Studies. 
The thesis also reviews the available literature written from a Western 
perspective, which rarely considers the role of religion in the integration process of 
refugees. In the Lebanese dilemma, where demographic balance is a major factor in 
domestic stability, religious affiliation emerges as a main influence in the contrasting 
treatment of Armenian and Palestinian refugees. 
With the continued conflict in Syria, Lebanon and other countries face similar 
challenges in addressing the refugee crisis. Thus, successful integration methods must 
include not only policies that address the humanitarian side of refugee flows but also the 
burden on host communities. Based on the case studies, the thesis concludes with 
recommendations for successfully integrating Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and policies 
that other host countries could adapt. 
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The interconnectedness of Lebanon and Syria dates back to ancient times through 
the period of Ottoman rule to the colonial era. As parts of what is historically known as 
Greater Syria, the modern states of Lebanon and Syria have been linked economically, 
socially, and politically.1 They also are connected by conflict; thousands of Syrians 
fleeing their war-torn country have sought refuge in Lebanon, which is close, both 
geographically and culturally. The Open Door policy adopted by the Lebanese 
government when the conflict first started in Syria has allowed the free flow of more than 
1.5 million Syrians, regardless of the nature of their displacement.2 According to the 
assessments of the Lebanese government, the total number of refugees in May 2014 
“constitutes 28.9 percent of Lebanon’s pre-conflict population estimated at around 4 
million persons in 1997.”3 Thus, alarmingly, Lebanon witnessed an accelerated growth in 
its population that surpassed projections for 2041.4 
This unprecedented influx of refugees has left Lebanon vulnerable to mounting 
tensions between some of the largest segments of this immigrant population. During the 
Syrian presidential elections, thousands of Syrians disrupted traffic in Beirut as they 
marched toward their embassy, often chanting in support of President Bashar al-Assad.5 
The elections revealed that Syrians in Lebanon are far from being one homogeneous anti-
regime group.6 Several parties, therefore, fear that Syrian refugees might carry with them 
to Lebanon the same dynamics that fuel the Syrian conflict. 
                                                 
1 Thomas Collelo and Harvey Henry Smith, Lebanon: A Country Study. (Washington, DC: 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1989), xxii. 
2 Filippo Dionigi, The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience 
(London: LSE Middle East Center, 2016), 11, 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65565/1/Dionigi_Syrian_Refugees%20in%20Lebanon_Author_2016.pdf.  
3 Ministry of Environment, Lebanon Environmental Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority 




5 Dionigi, Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon, 13–14. 
6 Ibid. 
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The current refugee crisis is not the first in Lebanon’s history. In the midst of 
World War I, for example, thousands of Armenians fled to Lebanon, where they 
established a distinct community. Even nowadays, recent generations of Armenians are 
successful in preserving their original identity and culture. Armenians in Lebanon, 
however, are not isolated. On the contrary, Armenians enrich Lebanon in all aspects, 
having become an integrated minority in Lebanese society.  
In contrast, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon remain isolated from a society 
that shares many similar characteristics with their own. As a result of the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war, more than 700,000 Palestinians lost their homes and means of livelihood.7 
Many chose to relocate to neighboring countries. In Lebanon, they lack several rights that 
other immigrants enjoy; for instance, Palestinians are prohibited from working in as 
many as 20 professions, such as medicine, law, or engineering because, legally, they are 
stateless.8 Therefore, they are not treated as other foreigners living and working in 
Lebanon. Moreover, around 53 percent of the 450,000 Palestinians currently registered 
with United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in 
Lebanon live in refugee camps.9 Still, their isolation from the rest of society did not stop 
some from assuming a principal role in the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990). Lebanon’s 
national security continues to be eroded by the presence of isolated Palestinian 
communities that provide breeding grounds for terrorists. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What accounts for the difference in the degree of integration between the 
Armenian and the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? 
                                                 
7 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, The United 
Nations and Palestinian Refugees (Gaza: Public Information Office, Headquarters, 2007), 2, 
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2010011791015.pdf. 
8 “Where We Work: Lebanon,” United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon; Jad Chaaban 
et al., Socio-economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (Beirut: American University of Beirut 
and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 2010), 13, 
https://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011012074253.pdf. 
9 “Where We Work: Lebanon,” United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East. 
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This thesis analyzes the cases of Armenian and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to 
determine what caused the differences in the integration process of these refugees within 
the Lebanese society. Although the Syrian refugees are not isolated like the Palestinian 
refugees, they face similar challenges to becoming integrated within Lebanese society. 
Specifically, they are facing similar—and increasing—pressure to return to Syria. This 
thesis examines whether it is rational for the Lebanese government to promote this option 
while the war in Syria has not ended, leaving the Syrian refugees no alternative but to get 
involved in combat activity while on Lebanese soil.  
The war in Syria is not likely to end in the near future. Even if it did, the Syrian 
refugees might remain in Lebanon for years before going back to their country. Their 
integration within Lebanese society may be crucial to prevent future radicalization and 
other security-related issues that seem to increase whenever refugees live in isolated and 
poor conditions. Drawing conclusions based on the Armenian and Palestinian cases, this 
thesis proposes policy recommendations that could be applied to the current Syrian 
refugee crisis. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Of course, providing humanitarian aid to the Syrian refugees is a priority; 
however, dealing with the increased pressure on Lebanon’s infrastructure, economy, and 
national security should not be neglected, either. The sharp increase in the demand for 
public services, including health, education, electricity, water, and waste disposal, has put 
a lot of strain on Lebanon. In December 2012, for example, Syrian refugees accounted 
for 40 percent of total health visits.10 Since 2011, petty crimes have increased by more 
than 60 percent, overcrowding the Lebanese prisons to the extent that more than 26 
percent of the population in Lebanese prisons is Syrians.11 Moreover, Lebanon is facing 
terrorism threats on a daily basis. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat 
al-Nusra have tried to establish secure bases on Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria. 
                                                 




Refugees are increasingly drawn to these extremist organizations that capitalize on the 
isolation of the Syrians from the rest of the Lebanese society. 
Despite the civil strife period, Lebanon, as a multi-faith society, is a model for 
religious coexistence in the Middle East. Precariously, Lebanon has managed to 
overcome the ramifications of the Sunni-Shia divide in the Muslim world.12 Moreover, 
democratic Lebanon also has maintained its political stability throughout the Arab Spring 
that toppled bigger republican governments in the region. 
The resilience of Lebanon in coping with both internal and external threats has 
increased the international community’s trust in one of the smallest countries in the 
regions. Since 2006, Lebanon received more than $1 billion in assistance from the United 
States to build Lebanon’s institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, to confront 
a range of security challenges.13 The United States continues to be Lebanon’s biggest ally 
in the war on terror. Furthermore, U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Elizabeth Richards 
affirms Lebanon’s role in the stability in the Middle East, an indispensable part of U.S. 
national security.14 
This thesis, however, is not only relevant to Lebanon. European and other 
Western countries are facing similar challenges in addressing the Syrian refugee flow, 
which is accompanied by or even resulting in the rise of right-wing parties and the 
emergence of populist politicians. The cultural and religious gap between Syrian refugees 
and European host communities further complicates the situation. The integration of 
refugees is an indispensable objective for policymakers; however, steady refugee flows 
have sparked suspicions in Lebanon and Western countries alike about the changing 
nature of the host communities, a phenomenon that  underline major policies. If the 
                                                 
12 After Prophet Muhammad’s death, a bitter split over his succession led to Islam’s Sunni-Shia 
divide. For more information, see Robert Brenton Betts, The Sunni-Shi’a Divide: Islam’s Internal Divisions 
and their Global Consequences (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013),  
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/27148  
13 Christopher M. Blanchard, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. R42816) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 11, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42816.pdf. 
14 “New U.S. Ambassador Says Lebanon Stability Important for Region Stability,” Naharnet, 
June 21, 2016, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/211853.  
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change is more than these communities can bear, then new policies should address the 
humanitarian side of refugee flows without neglecting the impact on host communities. 
C. LEBANON’S POWER SHARING 
The research on the integration of Armenian and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
must be grounded in Lebanon’s modern history. During the Ottoman rule, “Lebanon,” 
actually referred to as Mount Lebanon, was a predominantly Christian region “limited 
roughly to the Lebanon mountain range extending as far north and south as Tripoli and 
Sidon, but not including these cities.”15 After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World 
War I, the Allied Supreme Council granted France mandatory control of Mount Lebanon 
and Greater Syria. A few months later, France proclaimed the creation of the State of 
Greater Lebanon. 16  
The establishment of this new state followed a significant expansion of Lebanon’s 
boundaries. During World War I, the Maronite community, a longstanding French ally in 
the Arab world, had pressed for the extension of Mount Lebanon’s frontier to strengthen 
its political and economic power in the Arab world. The French, however, had legitimate 
fears that the Christians would lose their overwhelming majority in a larger country. 
After minor reluctance, France agreed to fulfill the Maronites’ pressing demands. At 
Syria’s expense, therefore, the French authorities almost doubled Lebanon’s territory by 
annexing to Mount Lebanon the Bekaa plains and the coastal regions of Tripoli, Beirut, 
Sidon, and Tyre.17 In contrast to the religious composition of Mount Lebanon, these new 
regions consisted mainly of Muslims.18 The French feared that their Maronite allies were 
bound to lose their hegemony in the new country. 
                                                 
15 Joseph Chamie, “The Lebanese Civil War: An Investigation into the Causes,” World Affairs 





For three-quarters of a century, the interconnectedness of politics, religion, and 
demography has remained an enduring characteristic of Lebanon.19 With 18 officially 
recognized sects, Lebanon nurtures the religious diversity among its different 
constituents. These sects, most of which belong to either Christianity or Islam, serve as 
the “primary social organization[s] through which political security has been 
maintained.”20 The Lebanese confessional democracy assures each religious sect, based 
on its size, a proportional share of the political power.  
Despite the overriding importance of religion in Lebanese affairs, there are no 
official statistics of the country’s religious composition. In 1932, Lebanon carried out its 
only population census.21 Figure 1 shows, in addition to the 1932 census, a series of 
debatable estimates on the religious composition of the Lebanese population. 
 
Figure 1.  Percentage of the Three Largest Religious Sects in Lebanon by Year, 
1932–2005.22 
Based on the 1932 census, Christians enjoyed a stronger representation, a six-to-
five ratio, over Muslims in political posts.23 Clearly, this figure does not hold anymore. 
Moreover, hardly anyone doubts that the demographic status of Christians in Lebanon is 
in decline. Since 1932, however, there has not been a full census because of the 
                                                 
19 Muhammad A. Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," Middle Eastern 
Studies 43, no. 6 (2007): 909, doi: 10.1080/00263200701568279. 
20 Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," 909. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Source: Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," 912. 
23 Simon Haddad, The Palestinian Impasse in Lebanon: The Politics of Refugee Integration 
(Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2003), 3. 
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underlying risks of new destabilizing results.24 On the other end of the spectrum lies the 
unlikely assumption that Muslims outnumber Christians by a two-to-one ratio.25 
Nowadays, the equal representation between Christians and Muslims, instead of 
the six-to-five ratio, governs the political system. Still, given that “the post of the 
president is reserved for a Maronite, the Prime Minister is a Sunni, and the Speaker of the 
House is a Shi’a,”26 the fragile stability of Lebanon lies in a precarious balance of power 
among its three major sects: Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature review, presented in Chapter II, does not deal specifically with the 
case studies addressed by the research question. The distinction, however, made in the 
literature review between the concept of integration in race relations studies in 
comparison to its use in refugee studies can help outline potential explanations for the 
disparities in the integration outcomes of the Armenian and Palestinian refugees.   
Race relations studies provide one possible explanation through scholar Shmuel 
Eisenstadt’s third stage of absorption, which is characterized by the development of a 
new identity as a basis for personal adjustment.27 Armenians and Palestinians diverge on 
this point. Moreover, religion, being part of the identity, plays an important role in the 
different level of acceptance of that refugees experience from the Lebanese society. The 
right of return to Palestine, which is advocated by both the Palestinian refugees and the 
Lebanese government, obstructs the development of this new identity required for the 
integration process. Certainly, Armenians did not completely forgo their historical and 
                                                 
24 Rebecca Roberts, Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-term Displacement 
(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010), 71. 
25 Haddad, Palestinian Impasse, 3. 
26 Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," 909; Roberts, Refugees Living with 
Long-term Displacement, 71. 
27 Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants: A Comparative Study Based Mainly 
on the Jewish Community in Palestine and the State of Israel (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 
1954), quoted in Barry N. Stein, “The Refugee Experience: Defining the Parameters of a Field of Study,” 
International Migration Review 15, no. 1/2 (1981): 329, doi: 10.2307/2545346. 
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religious identity, but they have considered their lives in Lebanon an essential and 
positive step towards a better Armenian existence across the world. 
Refugee studies outline several factors that can contribute to explain the 
disparities in the integration outcomes of both cases. Foremost, the debatable citizenship 
described in Alastair Ager and Alison Strang’s framework, a requirement for successful 
integration, seems, at first glance, a prominent explanation for the non-integration 
experience of Palestinian refugees since Palestinians born in Lebanon do not obtain 
Lebanese citizenship and are still considered refugees. Palestinian refugees themselves, 
however, consider obtaining a new citizenship as treason to their cause and the right to 
have their own independent state. Moreover, if Lebanon agrees on the naturalization of 
Palestinian refugees, it is also considered a departure from pan-Arab agreement to 
support the return of Palestinians to their lands. This alignment of interests between the 
Lebanese government and Palestinian refugees echoes Sara Kenyon Lischer’s analysis of 
the political dimensions that led to the rise of refugee warriors and their use of violence.28 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is based on two comparative case studies, examining 
Palestinian and Armenian refugees in Lebanon, respectively. These two cases are 
particularly significant because they share certain characteristics, yet result in different 
integration outcomes and security challenges. This thesis compares the integration of 
Armenian refugees in Lebanon to that of the Palestinian refugees to understand their 
similarities and differences.  
For each case study, the thesis presents a historical overview detailing the 
presence of the refugee community in Lebanon. It also discusses the response of the 
international community to the crisis. The thesis then outlines the legal status and rights 
of the refugees, before laying out the identity evolution of each refugee community. After 
introducing the two case studies in separate chapters, the thesis provides a detailed 
analysis using Ager and Strang’s “Indicators of Integration Framework” to determine 
                                                 
28 Sara Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian aid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 1-15. 
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which factors caused the disparities in the integration outcomes of these the two cases.29 
Lastly, this thesis uses the lessons learned from the Armenian and Palestinian case studies 
to provide some required policy recommendations for the integration of the Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The introductory chapter provides the necessary contextual background to frame 
the research question. The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows. The next chapter 
presents the literature review and outlines the framework to be used in the analysis of the 
two case studies. Chapters III and IV of this thesis explore the case studies of the 
Armenian and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, respectively. Chapter V presents the 
analysis of the two case studies using the conceptual framework that was outlined in 
Chapter II. The analysis presents the priorities of the factors that lead to the integration of 
refugees. Chapter VI covers the current Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. This final 
chapter uses the lessons learned from the analysis of the two case studies to propose some 
policy recommendations to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis. 
  
                                                 
29 Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, “Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 2 (June 2008): 169–170, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fen016. 
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II. REFUGEES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of the causes and consequences of the forced migration of people has 
grown into its own field of studies in the last decades of the 20th century. This literature 
review, bounded by the major research question, focuses on the integration of refugees. 
First, the literature review underscores how the definition of the term refugee evolved 
since the Second World War. Next, it examines the concept of integration as it is used in 
both race relations studies and refugee studies. The final part of the literature review 
addresses the security threats arising from refugees to shed light on possible ramifications 
of the failure to integrate the Syrian refugees. 
A. DEFINING REFUGEES 
Refugees have become a permanent feature of the international scene. Still, to 
define a refugee according to a single universal formula involves an unrealistic 
assumption that all refugees embark on their journeys for the same reasons. In their book, 
Escape from Violence, Sergio Aguayo, Astri Suhrke, and Aristide Zolberg point out that 
Jacques Vernant probably was not wrong when, in 1953, he observed that “in everyday 
speech a refugee is someone who has been compelled to abandon his home.”30 The 
authors argue, however, that this diffuse meaning can only be found in ordinary parlance, 
whereas in legal and administrative circles, “refugee” holds a much more selective and 
precise meaning.31 
The definition of “refugee” has changed with the nature of refugees over the 
years. The internationally adopted definition of refugee is embodied in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the Statute of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).32 In the aftermath of World 
                                                 
30 Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953), 5, 
quoted in Sergio Aguayo, Astri Suhrke and Aristide R. Zolberg, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Susan M. Akram, “Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and 
Implications for a Just Solution,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 3 (2002): 36, doi: 
10.1525/jps.2002.31.3.36. 
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War II, during which thousands of people were displaced, the 1951 Convention defined a 
refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing 
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”33 Article 1D of the 1951 
Convention, however, excludes from this definition the Palestinian refugees who were 
protected and assisted by other UN agencies such as the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission on Palestine (UNCCP) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).34 According to UNRWA, “Palestine refugees” refers to 
“persons whose normal residence was in Palestine between 1 June 1946 and 15 May 
1948, and who lost their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 
conflict.”35 
Beyond the 1951 Convention, regional arrangements expanded the definition of 
refugee to fit the region’s special requirements. The extended refugee definition offers 
protection to vulnerable people not covered by the 1951 Convention. One important 
development to the refugee definition emerged in 1969 through the Convention on 
Refugee Problems in Africa to include the unique nature of refugee flows on this 
continent.36 According to this African convention, those compelled to flee “owing to 
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part of the whole of his country of origin or nationality” are also to be 
accepted as refugees.37 Through deeper analysis, Micah Rankin finds the African refugee 
definition contrasted with the one found in the 1951 Convention in its objectivity, non-
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specificity to certain causes of flight, and group flight focus.38 Another development took 
place in Central America; the Cartagena Declaration, adopted by ten states, further 
recognized the flight from “massive violation of human rights.”39 
Despite the broader definition of refugee, the universally adopted 1951 
Convention had its own shortcomings. For one, it explicitly covered only European 
refugees of World War II. Jeremy Hein explains that up until the 1967 amendment, the 
1951 Convention did not reach out to “refugees in the rest of the world.”40 According to 
Liisa Malkki, the Euro-centrism in the refugee definition is justified by the European 
effort to innovatively standardize and develop key techniques to manage the mass 
displacement of people after World War II.41 
Another shortcoming of the definition was the emphasis on the ambiguous 
“persecution” condition, a remnant of the Euro-centric development to the refugee 
definition. Although none of the UN conventions clarifies “persecution,” Peter Gatrell 
considers persecution a key criterion to protect those fleeing from the Soviet Union and 
other totalitarian states.42 Even after lifting the time and geographical restrictions in the 
1967 Protocol, the post-war definition bestowed refugee status—and protections—only to 
the individual who could demonstrate persecution.43 This emphasis on the individual who 
did not fit the persecution criterion left other forced migrants in the developing world 
without protection. For instance, Susan Akram explains how Palestinians living outside 
Palestine “cannot claim the original persecution by Israel because they are not Israeli 
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44, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083380. 
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42 Gatrell, Modern Refugee, 284. 
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nationals.”44 In the typical African group flights as well, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill notes that 
the UNHCR could not apply the individualized approach in refugee status assessment 
that took place in Europe.45 According to UNHCR’s staff, the case-by-case assessment 
required to prove the persecution condition was, at best, impractical in underdeveloped 
Africa.46 Nevertheless, Gatrell and Akram still consider the individualized approach an 
improvement to the pre-war doctrine that afforded protection only to certain specified 
groups.47 
Some scholars even go so far as to decry a gender gap in this uneven protection. 
In the book, Human Rights and Social Justice in a Global Perspective, Susan Mapp 
discusses how the international community’s focus on persecution leaves women and 
children without protection.48 Likewise, scholars David Cox and Manohar Pawar 
recognize the tendency to consider males the direct focus of persecution, despite the fact 
that women and children suffer greatly during conflicts.49 
B. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION IN RACE RELATIONS STUDIES 
The lack of a consistent, generally accepted definition of integration leaves the 
term up to interpretation and even debate. Indeed, experts such as Vaughan Robinson 
point out that “integration is a chaotic concept: a word used by many but understood 
differently by most.”50 Experts have recognized this ambiguity in the definition of 
integration. Scholar Maja Korac, for example, differentiates between integration in the 
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refugee studies and integration in race relations literature.51 Even the UNHCR, a leading 
authority on refugee issues, points out that much of the discussion in government and 
academic circles has centered on a wide understanding of integration.52 Following 
Korac’s observation, this literature review differentiates between the concept of 
integration in refugee studies and its treatment in race relations. 
In race relations studies, integration represents “the process of change that occurs 
when two [different] cultures are forced to co-exist within one society.”53 Within this 
field of study, however, integration has a wide range of interpretations ranging from total 
assimilation into the host society to multiculturalism and cultural diversity. Nevertheless, 
the terms “integration,” “assimilation,” and “multiculturalism” have been often used 
interchangeably regardless of their different denotations. Scholars such as Irene 
Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul have even mistakenly equated the 
terms by identifying them as synonyms.54 
In its root origins, assimilation never intended to have its current implications. 
The 1951 UN Refugee Convention established the initial concept of assimilation in which 
both refugees and host societies are expected to adapt to each other; however, the term 
has become associated with refugees relinquishing their cultural characteristics to become 
a part of the host society.55 Recognizing the implications, Barbara Harrell-Bond argues 
that refugees are unlikely “to accept the idea of permanent incorporation into the host 
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society.”56 Such early works as scholar Eisenstadt’s study on the absorption of the Jewish 
community in Palestine and Israel, however, focus on the aspect of refugee absorption in 
a larger society without exploring the adaptation of the host society. Eisenstadt divides 
the absorption process into four stages: 
1. Acquisition of language, norms, and customs. 
2. Acquisition of new skills to perform new roles and handle new situations. 
3. Development of a new identity as a basis for personal adjustment. 
4. Shift from participation in institutions of the smaller group to participation 
in the institutions of the host society.57 
Policy makers thought that assimilation could eliminate the cultural differences 
and, thus, create a homogeneous society free of societal frictions. Analyzing assimilation 
in American life, Milton Gordon, distinguishes among three different models of 
assimilation: 
1. Anglo-conformity: In a universal sense, the refugee accepts the dominant 
culture in the host community and becomes like the native. 
2. Melting Pot: A widely known ideology of the assimilation concept is the 
melting pot theory in which both the native and the refugee fuse to form a 
supposedly better outcome. Gordon’s study on American society finds the 
melting pot idea embedded in the rhetoric of two U.S. presidents, 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, as a response to the increasing 
immigrant-receiving experience of the nation. 
3. Cultural pluralism: Although the refugee acculturates to the dominant 
pattern especially for politics, work, and education, he preserves much of 
his culture and communal life.58 
Despite these three different connotations, the term assimilation has become 
associated with a negative implication. Ager and Strang write that “ethno-cultural 
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political exclusion tends to be associated with ‘assimilation’ models of integration.”59 
Nowadays, liberal democracies condone notions of assimilation based on conformity and 
melting pot models.60 Perhaps Spain is a rare occurrence where the conformity model 
still shapes an integration policy.61 The international community, in general, refuses to 
insist on total assimilation, in which refugees are expected to become identical to the host 
community, as the model for integration.62  
By and large, such integration experts as Stephen Castles, Maja Korac, Ellie 
Vasta, and Steven Vertovec stress that integration is predominantly a “two-way process” 
that “requires adaption on the part of the newcomer but also by the host society.”63 The 
British interpretation of integration similarly favors cultural diversity over the narrow 
definition of assimilation.64 In 1968, British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins stated that 
integration should be considered “not as a flattening process of uniformity, but as cultural 
diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”65 This 
interpretation of integration advocates the preservation of cultural and religious identities. 
Nevertheless, arguments against cultural diversity often rest on the beliefs that 
multiculturalism reduces the integration of refugees and other immigrants.66 Sir Trevor 
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Phillips, chair of the Commission of Racial Equality in the United Kingdom, believes that 
multiculturalism results in a fragmented society and disrupts the national collective 
solidarity.67 Following the riots in the northwest of England in 2001, Phillips argues 
against state-sponsored multiculturalism, describing United Kingdom’s society as being 
fragmented and “sleepwalking to segregation.”68 David Bates adds that refugees lack 
certain British values and, therefore, weaken the British national identity.69 Moreover, he 
points out that homegrown terrorism raises new concerns about threats to national 
security posed by cultural diversity and lack of integration.70 
As a result, recent British policies have shifted from favoring multiculturalism 
toward community cohesion by placing greater emphasis on the integration of minorities 
through citizenship, however, selecting only those suitable to be part of British society.71 
The political narrative leading up to Brexit centered on immigration and the threats posed 
by multiculturalism to the British national identity. Moreover, terrorist attacks in Europe 
with ties to refugees and other migrants fanned the resurgence of far-right wing groups 
such as the UK Independent Party (UKIP).72 
C. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION IN REFUGEE STUDIES  
In the context of refugee studies, scholars interpret integration in terms of its 
functional aspects. Harrell-Bond’s straightforward definition highlights the importance of 
exploring the practical perspective of integration: “a situation in which host and refugee 
communities are able to coexist, sharing the same resources—both economic and 
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social—with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host 
community.”73 
The growing concern over the increasing flow of refugees impels researchers to 
identify measures of refugees’ integration in a society.74 The framework developed by 
Ager and Strang, as shown in Figure 2, outlines the foundation for various empirical 
studies on immigrants and refugees by identifying the key components of integration.75 
 
Figure 2.   A Conceptual Framework Defining Core Domains of Integration.76  
The framework groups the proposed key domains of integration into four overall 
categories:  
1. Foundation: “Rights and Citizenship” afforded to refugees. 
2. Facilitators of Integration: Refugees’ “Language and Cultural Knowledge” 
of the new host society.  
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3. Social Connection: Ties within the refugee group – “Social Bonds;” 
connections with other communities – “Social Bridges;” ties with state 
structures – “Social Links.” 
4. Markers and Means: Access to the education, employment, housing, and 
health sectors.77 
The impact of citizenship in the integration process is debatable. In their proposed 
framework, Ager and Strang consider rights and citizenship the foundation for a 
successful integration process.78 Similarly, Alexandra Fielden mentions that integration, 
in its narrow meaning, is considered a durable solution only when a refugee receives the 
citizenship of the host country. However, Fielden also points out that a broader 
understanding of integration suggests that at least “three distinct but inter-related legal, 
economic, and social and cultural dimensions … are important for refugees’ ability to 
integrate successfully” without actually naturalizing refugees.79 The study by Korac on 
Yugoslavian refugees in the Netherlands proves Fielden’s argument; acquiring Dutch 
citizenship was not sufficient for a complete and successful integration of these 
refugees.80  
D. REFUGEE INFLOWS AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT 
Nowhere does the association between the broader category of immigrants and 
refugees diverge like it does in the discourse of securitization of migration. Immigrants 
do not enjoy the same admission rights of refugees. Reg Whitaker points out that all 
states agree that there is no right of immigration.81 International law can positively 
influence the behavior of states toward immigration; however, states armed with national 
sovereignty claims choose which and how many may immigrate. 
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Refugees, on the other hand, do not follow the same immigration regulations. 
States that have ratified the 1951 Convention concede to the legal obligations of 
accepting qualified applicants to the refugee status.82 Of course, procedures ensure only 
those who are in need of protection receive asylum; however, these procedures may not 
conform to the state’s own national criteria for admission.83 
This humanitarian and legal commitment undermines the ability of receiving 
states to control who gets admitted to the country. In this context, refugees are portrayed 
as sources of fear and threats to national security. In their article, Refugees and the 
Spread of Civil War, Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsh agree that the majority 
of refugees may never engage in direct violence; however, empirical analysis proves that 
“refugee flows may facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and 
ideologies conductive to conflict.”84 Salehyan and Gleditsh’s argument complements 
Whitaker’s assumption about host states moving toward control and exclusion of 
refugees to protect their national security.85 
A widely debated topic nowadays addresses the possibility of refugees bringing 
their own conflicts to the new host countries. Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo devised the 
term “refugee warrior” to refer to “highly conscious refugee communities with a political 
leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective, be it 
to recapture the homeland, change the regime, or secure a separate state.”86 Interestingly, 
this definition does not attribute any socio-economic factors to the militarization of 
refugees.87 Similarly, in the parallel research field of terrorism studies, scholars try to 
identify what drives individuals to violence. Among those who discredit socio-economic 
factors such as poverty is Princeton economist Alan Krueger. In his book exploring what 
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makes a terrorist, Krueger could not find empirical evidence relating material deprivation 
to terrorism.88 In a similar vein, Lischer adds that the socio-economic conditions of 
refugee encampments have been given too much attention in explaining refugee 
violence.89 
Alternatively, Lischer introduces an analysis framework that highlights the 
political dimensions that may lead to refugee-related violence. The proposed framework 
consists of three variables. The first variable is related to the origins of the refugee crisis. 
First, Lischer finds that refugees fleeing from ethnic or religious persecution in their 
home countries are more prone to engage in violence than refugees escaping general 
insecurities.90 Second, Lischer discusses the role of receiving states in controlling the rise 
of refugee warriors. Host states whose interests align with those of the refugees or states 
that do not have the ability to stop militarism among refugees increase the refugees’ 
tendency to use violence.91 Finally, external factors, including humanitarian aid 
organizations, can tip the balance of power towards either the refugees or the sending 
country, thus inciting one or the other into violent actions.92 These three factors, outlined 
by Lischer, can explain the increase in refugee militancy around the world. 
While the majority of scholars argue that refugees diffuse conflicts across 
international borders, Andrew Shaver and Yang-Yang Zhou dispute this claim in their 
research, “Questioning Refugee Camps as Sources of Conflict.”93 They find evidence 
linking increased stability with refugee arrival, especially since the majority of refugees 
are civilians and children constitute more than half of refugees in the world.94 Their 
results are consistent with viewpoints of humanitarian relief agencies who describe 
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refugee communities consisting of vulnerable individuals. U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Antonio Guterres, on the other hand, warns that “failing to provide help for 
Syrian refugees and their host countries could destabilize the entire region.”95 Guterres 
realizes that there is certain limit to what these refugee communities can withstand.  
The literature review exhibits a Western approach to the integration problem of 
refugees. Moreover, rarely does religion show up in scholars’ work either as hampering 
or promoting the integration process of refugees. Ignoring religion as a factor in the 
integration process of refugees seems counterintuitive in the Lebanese dilemma, where 
demographic balance is a major factor in the country’s stability. This thesis, therefore, 
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III. ARMENIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON 
The Armenian experience in Lebanon differs greatly from the situation of other 
minorities in the Arab states. Within a few decades after World War I, the close-knit 
Armenians transformed themselves from a detached and unintegrated refugee community 
to an indispensable constituent of modern Lebanon. Remarkably, the integration of the 
non-Arab Armenians within Lebanese society took place just as rising Arab nationalism 
swept the Middle Eastern countries. This successful integration defies some of the 
conventional arguments, especially the language barrier, made in contemporary research 
on refugee integration. Indeed, Armenian refugees in Lebanon, where many second and 
even third generation Armenians still speak “a crude colloquial Arabic,”96 call into 
question the emphasis of current Western policies on language instruction as the key to 
the integration of refugees. Instead, the Lebanese confessional political system provided 
the opportunity for the Armenians to preserve and develop their own culture while 
participating fully in the country’s political life. 
This chapter first traces the historical background of the Armenian presence in 
Lebanon. It then examines the international legal response to the Armenian refugee crisis. 
Later, the chapter outlines the legal status and rights of the Armenians in Lebanon before 
the discussion concludes by laying out the evolution of the Armenian identity in 
Lebanon. 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ARMENIAN PRESENCE IN 
LEBANON 
Although the 20th century witnessed the consolidation of the Armenian presence 
in Lebanon, Armenians had migrated to Lebanon “on a minor scale throughout the 
centuries since the Crusades.”97 In the 17th century, the Lebanese Catholic Maronites 
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provided refuge for persecuted Armenian Catholics from Anatolia.98 With the support of 
the Lebanese Christian Maronites, these Armenian Catholics established the first 
Armenian community in Lebanon.99 Their shared religious beliefs allowed the easy 
integration of Armenians, often through intermarriage with the native Christian 
Maronites, into the Lebanese society. 
Around the year 1880, the first Apostolic Armenians settled in Lebanon by choice 
as entrepreneurs and students.100 With the increasing Ottoman oppression in the 1890s, 
thousands of Armenian refugees found Lebanon, then a semi-autonomous Ottoman 
province under European protection, an appealing secure destination.101 The influx of 
Apostolic Armenians overshadowed the Armenian Catholic presence.102 The arrival of 
Apostolic Armenians introduced, in effect, a deviation from the previously established 
affiliation between Armenians and Maronites. Unlike their Catholic predecessors, these 
new settlers set themselves apart by creating schools and other social organizations 
focused on the preservation of the Armenian character—with the approval of the 
Lebanese Maronite leadership. Politically, Armenian nationalism witnessed a noticeable 
increase after the Armenian nationalist Dashnak Party established its Lebanese branch in 
Beirut.103 Thus, when World War I started, the Armenian community, though only 
numbering a few thousand souls, had already found in Lebanon a hospitable environment 
for the fostering of Armenian ethnic and national consciousness. 
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Although the presence of Armenians in Lebanon dates to well before the 20th 
century, the Lebanese Armenian community, numbering today around 100,000, grew out 
of the massive Armenian refugee waves in the first half of that century.104 In particular, 
the expansion of the Armenian community began at the end of World War I when 
“approximately 40,000 Armenians settled in Beirut and the northern region of Mount 
Lebanon.”105 The instability of the interwar period drove more Armenians to relocate to 
Lebanon. In 1922 and in exchange for Turkish acceptance of French control over Syria, 
France withdrew from occupied Cilicia, “the ancient Armenian kingdom in what is now 
southwestern Turkey.”106 Fearing the resumption of persecution, many Cilician 
Armenians escaped to Lebanon.107  
By 1926, the Armenian population in Lebanon was composed mainly of refugees. 
During the years 1929 and 1930, the majority of the Armenian population in Turkish 
Anatolia also fled to Lebanon.108 Another big wave of refugees—nearly 15,000 
Armenians—reached Lebanon between 1937 and 1939, after the French returned to 
Turkey its Alexandretta Sanjak region.109 After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, a final influx 
of approximately 5,000 Armenians came from Palestine into Lebanon.110 During these 
first decades of the 20th century, Armenians found Lebanon an important factor in their 
survival as a community. 
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B. ARMENIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The experience of World War I raised public concern over the suffering of 
innocent civilians caught up in the war. The Allies, however, took timid actions to 
prosecute those who violated the laws and customs of war. Moreover, the Hague 
Convention of 1907 defined the concept of “war crimes” as violent acts committed by “a 
belligerent state against the soldiers or civilians of another state.”111 This definition, 
though, did not include the crimes perpetrated in the Ottoman Empire against its 
Armenian minority. In the 1919 Preliminary Paris Peace Conference, the Commission on 
the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties debated 
whether such acts constituted, instead of war crimes, “crimes against the laws of 
humanity.”112 The participants at the Paris Peace Conference concluded that the concept 
of “laws of humanity” was too vague to have any significance in a court of law.113 
Behind this historic decision, however, lay the interests of the United States and Japan. 
For the American government facing the Bolshevik threat, Turkey represented a 
“potential ally that needed to be appeased.”114 
The postwar diplomacy and division among the Allied powers contributed to the 
humanitarian disaster that accompanied the collapse and fragmentation of the Ottoman 
Empire.115 The United States did not want to offer opportunities to a communist Russia 
by weakening the Turkish government further. Nonetheless, on August 19, 1920, the 
Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire concluded the Treaty of Sèvres with 
commitments to try Turkish officials.116 The French and British demanded several 
provisions that promised the trial of persons responsible for the atrocities perpetrated 
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against the Armenians. Articles 226 and 230 of this treaty explicitly note the “crimes 
against humanity” committed by the Ottomans.117 Under the stipulations of this treaty, 
victorious Allies also divided among them much of Ottoman territory and placed the rest 
under strict economic and military oversight. Out of parts of the Eastern and Southern 
Caucasus, the Allies even carved a new state for Armenians. Immediately thereafter, 
nationalist Turks challenged the French colonial forces, Greeks, and Armenians for the 
control of Anatolia.118 Although Turkey signed the Treaty of Sèvres, legal ratification 
never followed. Turkish authorities only held a few trials to convict soldiers of violating 
simply the Turkish military code.119 Under the pretense of protecting national 
sovereignty, the international community, therefore, failed to punish Turkish war 
criminals of World War I. 
In addition to the creation of the “Republic Turkey in 1922” and “the absorption 
of Armenia into the Soviet Union,” the Turkish “armed resistance against the Western 
occupation” of Anatolia resulted in “the abrogation of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923.”120 The Allies’ failure to ensure the implementation of the Treaty 
of Sèvres dealt the “final blow to Armenia” and the aspirations of Armenian refugees to 
go back to their homeland.121 In addition, the Treaty of Lausanne granted amnesty to 
former Ottoman Empire officials previously found guilty of war crimes under the 
stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres.122 These new developments not only led to new 
waves of refugees but also made the displacement of Armenians into countries like 
Lebanon permanent and irreversible.123 The superseding Treaty of Lausanne entitled 
Armenian refugees now living in Lebanon and other former Ottoman territories to 
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citizenship in their host countries.124 As a result, Armenian refugees came to realize “that 
their stay in Lebanon might not be as temporary as they had supposed.”125 
Despite all the political setbacks in the aftermath of World War I, the fledgling 
League of Nations adopted a new policy favoring a humanitarian approach over a 
political solution to repair the damage inflicted by the war on Armenians.126 According 
to Keith David Watenpaugh, the League envisioned its mandate to embrace “remedying 
the injuries of the Armenians as a consequence of the war and Genocide.”127 Along 
liberal Wilsonian lines, the League formulated its humanitarian operations, known 
collectively as the Rescue Movement, to reclaim Islamized Armenian women and 
children refugees.128 The League’s efforts to settle Armenian refugees in Syria and 
Lebanon, as explained by Watenpaugh, “were based on the concept of communal 
survival rather than of Assimilation.”129 These early humanitarian initiatives following 
World War I would lay the groundwork for the evolution of international humanitarian 
and human rights law. 
C. LEGAL STATUS OF ARMENIANS IN LEBANON 
On August 31, 1924, the French authorities granted Lebanese citizenship to all 
Armenian refugees in Lebanon in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne between the 
Allies and Turkey.130 The French policy of altering the status of Armenians in Lebanon 
emanates from France’s desire to pursue several strategic goals in the Middle East. 
Granting citizenship for Armenian refugees ensured their permanent separation from the 
newly establish Turkish country. The Treaty of Lausanne, therefore, appeased Turkey 
and legitimized the French rule over former Ottoman provinces. More importantly, 
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France aspired to create a demographic Christian majority in Lebanon that would serve as 
a long-term ally in a largely Islamic region.131 
This decision, however, prompted widespread public opposition from Muslim 
leaders, who accused France of bolstering the Christian majority in the newly established 
Greater Lebanon.132 The opposing viewpoints sparked a heated debate in Lebanon’s 
newspapers, as well as in the country’s Representative Council, the predecessor of the 
Lebanese Parliament. Muslim deputies strongly protested the entry and naturalization of 
Armenians. The Christian Maronites, on the other hand, publicly supported the 
permanent settlement of Armenians in Lebanon.133 Christian leaders headed by the 
Maronite Patriarch embraced the Armenians and even urged the Mandatory government 
to allocate more funds for the welfare of Armenian refugees.134 The binding Christian 
identity formed the impetus of the Maronite’s generosity towards the Armenians. 
The integration of the Armenian community in Lebanon’s political, economic, 
social system grew as a result of the opportunities afforded after they gained Lebanese 
citizenship. With their newly afforded citizenship, Armenians could work legally, own 
property, and move freely inside the country. The French, immediately thereafter, 
“reinforced and expanded the political spaces reserved for the Armenians in the new 
confessional system being established in Lebanon.”135 In 1929, the election of Abdullah 
Ishaq, the first Catholic Armenian in the Lebanese Parliament, as representative of the so-
called minorities opened the door for the participation of Armenians in political life. The 
election of a Catholic Armenian, however, meant little to the emerging Dashnak leaders 
of the Apostolic Armenian majority.136  
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The real steps toward Armenian participation in Lebanon’s political life took 
place a few years later when a January 2, 1934 decree, first granted Apostolic Armenians 
the right to have their own elected deputy in the parliament.137 Although the Armenian 
quota increased in consecutive Parliamentary elections, the Lebanese political system did 
not equate the Armenians with the other six predominant communities. After the civil 
war, however, the National Reconciliation Accord recognized the Armenians as “one of 
the seven main communities of the country rather than the seventh one,” explains Hagop 
Pakradounian, the Armenian Dashnak MP elected in 2005.138 Thus, after the 1990s, 
Armenians won an unprecedented total of seven seats in the Lebanese Parliament. The 
Taif Agreement, known as the National Reconciliation Accord, also guaranteed the 
Armenians a minimum of one ministerial post in any Cabinet.139 On one hand, the legal 
rights obtained through citizenship facilitated their integration into the Lebanese politics. 
On the other, the Lebanese confessional system allowed Armenian leaders the adoption 
of a communalist strategy to ensure the needs of the Armenian community.  
Nowadays, the Armenians of Lebanon constitute one of the most important 
Armenian communities in the world. Armenians understandably speak of Lebanon as 
their “second homeland.”140 Likewise, the Lebanese people exhibit warmth and 
sympathy with Armenians. During his incumbency from 1952 to 1958, Lebanese 
President Camille Chamoun amicably addressed the Armenians: “You should consider 
yourself in your own home, since it is without exaggeration when I say Lebanon is a 
second Armenia.”141 Nowhere else in the Arab states do the Armenians enjoy the same 
opportunities and benefits afforded to them by their stay in Lebanon. These freedoms on 
the political, economic, and communal autonomy level have distinguished Lebanon and 
its role in the Armenian diaspora. 
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D. ARMENIAN IDENTITY 
Standing out as Lebanon’s only community that is neither Arab nor primarily 
Arab-speaking, Armenians represent one unique element in Lebanon’s “mosaic of 
minorities.”142 The preservation of a distinct Armenian identity—based on the memory 
of persecution and forced deportation—among new generations of Armenians constitutes 
one main function of Armenian organizations in Lebanon.143 Armenian churches and 
schools have successfully promoted this national identity by teaching Armenian history 
and language.144 The Armenian Church’s pivotal role in the preservation of the Armenian 
identity transformed Lebanon into a spiritual hub for all the diaspora. In 1928, Beirut 
became central to the Armenian diaspora after the Armenian Catholic Church relocated 
its headquarters from Constantinople to Lebanon.145 Similarly in 1930, the Catholicosate 
of Cilicia, the holy “see of the two preeminent pontiffs or Catholicoi in the Armenian 
Apostolic Church,” moved to Lebanon where it “exercised jurisdiction over all the 
Apostolic Armenians of Lebanon, Syria, Jerusalem, and Cyprus.”146 Several carefully 
observed commemorations such as the Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day and 
Armenia’s Independence Day passed the traumatic experience of the Genocide from 
Armenian refugees who first settled in Lebanon to subsequent generations. These 
ceremonies solidified the Armenian common national identity that hinges on the hope 
and aspirations of returning to the lost ancestral homeland.  
During the years 1946 and 1947, the departure of 30,000 Armenians from 
Lebanon and Syria to Soviet Armenia best exemplifies this sense of temporary residency 
in Lebanon.147 The Lebanese government, requiring departing Armenians to sell all their 
possessions, facilitated a demographic shift. Thousands of Muslim Shias from South 
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Lebanon moved to Beirut to fill the sudden surplus in commercial and residential 
properties.148 This internal displacement to the capital presented the Shias new economic 
opportunities. The migration of thousands of Armenians not only had an impact on the 
Lebanese identity but also strengthened the commitment of the remaining community to a 
united Armenian identity. 
The internal linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity of the Armenian refugees, 
however, delayed the consolidation of a united Armenian identity.149 In addition, 
Armenian refugees lived physically segregated, almost exclusively according to their 
regions of origin.150 Still, Armenian leaders succeeded in cultivating a unified identity by 
portraying the development of the Armenian neighborhoods in Beirut simply as a 
resurrection of the Armenian community in a new location. Thus, Armenian 
neighborhoods in Lebanon bore the names of the residents’ towns of origin.151 Various 
Armenian political, cultural, and religious organizations also cooperated to promote a 
united Armenian identity.152 Through the joint efforts of these organizations, the diverse 
and fragmented sub-identities of Armenian refugees in Lebanon forged a unified national 
consciousness and identity. 
For refugees, whose lives are in a “constant physical, social, moral, and cultural 
flux,” the notion of identity as a solid and fixed concept typically hinders their ability to 
integrate in a new society. Despite the discernible preservation of the Armenian identity, 
several studies show the tendency of the Armenian community in Lebanon to borrow 
from the Arab Christian culture. These developments to the Armenian identity eased their 
integration and prosperity in their new environment. Several indications confirm that the 
Armenian community in Lebanon is growing more like the majority culture. In 1958, the 
involvement of the Lebanese-Armenians in intra-communal violence suggests that the 
community was not isolated but, in fact, integrated within the socio-political fabric of 
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Lebanon.153 The Armenians, like other Lebanese factions, participated in the fighting 
resulting from existing religious and political tensions in the country. In 1973, professors 
from the American University in Beirut compared the scores of two groups of university 
students, Lebanese Arab Christians and Lebanese Armenians, on a standardized 
questionnaire that measured 15 different personality characteristics. The test taken by 
similar groups of subjects in 1956 showed that Lebanese Armenians differed from the 
Lebanese Arab Christians on ten out of the 15 variables.154 Figure 3 summarizes the 
occurring change during this period of 17 years. While both groups had evolved from 
1956 to 1973, the scores indicated a greater transformation among Armenians in the 
direction of the Lebanese Arab Christians. 
 
H stands for Armenians Scoring Higher than Lebanese Christian Arabs 
L stands for Armenians Scoring Lower than Lebanese Christian Arabs 
N stands for No Difference between the groups 
Figure 3.  Personality Variables and the Relative Performance of the Lebanese 
Armenian and Lebanese Christian Arab Groups in 1956 and 1973.155  
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In 1973, Armenian university students, therefore, resembled more their Arab Christian 
counterparts than they did in 1956. Figure 4 explains the personality variables used in the 
survey. 
 
Figure 4.  Personality Variables.156 
After the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the determination of the 
Armenian community to stay in the country consolidated the changing nature of their 
identity to include a sense of belonging to Lebanon. During this war, the Armenian 
leaders adopted what they called a “positive neutrality” policy “to steer clear of 
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partisanship with any of the warring Lebanese parties and avoid potential Armenian intra-
communal violence.”157  Interestingly, the Armenians refused to support the Christians. 
Scholars Aghop Der-Karabetian and Armine Proudian-Der-Karabetian report that “some 
Arab Christians [in Lebanon] regarded the Armenian posture as an open betrayal of trust 
developed over a number of decades.”158 Others used the positive neutrality policy as 
evidence of Armenians being “outsiders” because they did not take any sides in the 
conflict: “They have a kind of double allegiance. Not once in their political history in 
Lebanon have they behaved as Lebanese first. They always behave as Armenians first 
and then Lebanese.”159  
Similarly, in a defamatory speech Lebanese President Bachir Gemayel, then 
leader of Christian armed militias, accused the Armenians of ingratitude and even 
betrayal: “We opened our hearts to them ... we never made them feel as foreigners in 
Lebanon … but these actions were not mutual … when time came to pay a blood tax”; 
the Armenians refused to return the favor.160 The Armenians, however, played an 
important role in mediating between the various religious and political parties. Thus, by 
adopting the positive neutrality attitude, Armenians gained the important trust of Muslims 
in Lebanon. 
Few considered that the neutral stance demonstrated devotion and stronger ties 
between Armenians and Lebanon. At least, they refused to participate in the destruction 
of the country and jeopardize their position. The civil war, however, reinforced their 
distinct identity. According to one study, the inter-communal violence in Lebanon “has 
sensitized the Armenian community to its differentiation from other groups, rigidified its 
ethnic boundaries,” and increased its in-group allegiance.161 The study concluded that a 
                                                 
157 Geukjian, “From Positive Neutrality to Partisanship,” 743. 
158 Aghop Der-Karabetian and Armine Proudian-Der-Karabetian, Ethnicity and Civil War: The 
Lebanese-Armenian Case (La Verne, CA: University of La Verne, 1984), 18. 
159 Kotchikian, “Between (Home)land and (Host)land,” 470; Stephen K. Hindy, “Lebanon 
Armenians Fighting for Survival: Clannishness Tends to Make Them a Vulnerable Minority during Strife,” 
Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), November 8, 1979, j3. 
160 Abramson, “Lebanese Armenians,” 209. 
161 Der-Karabetian and Proudian-Der-Karabetian, The Lebanese-Armenian Case, 18. 
 38 
solidified Armenian identity, however, “is not necessarily associated with lower 
Lebanese national sentiments.”162 
The declaration of Armenia’s independence on September 21, 1991, signaled a 
new reality that the Armenian community in Lebanon had to face. The reemergence of 
the independent Armenia, which coincided with the end of the Lebanese civil war, 
transformed the “homeland” from a symbolic concept into an actual existence.163 These 
developments formed the ultimate test to the Armenians in Lebanon. In 1988, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Soviet Armenia and neighboring Azerbaijan had 
already symbolized the importance of territory in the identity-making process of the 
Armenians in Lebanon. In Armenian-populated neighborhoods in Lebanon, posters and 
pamphlets announcing “Karabakh belongs to Armenia” became a common sight. Even as 
the final rounds of the Lebanese civil war were still ranging, Armenians would gather to 
watch recorded videotapes from Soviet Armenian television about the ongoing clashes in 
the Armenian enclave of Soviet Azerbaijan.164 This period of identity negotiation 
between the homeland and Lebanon ended with the maturation of a hybrid Lebanese-
Armenian identity. Thus, the duality between Armenian and Lebanese identity empowers 
the Armenian community without preventing its members from feeling “100% 
Armenians and 100% Lebanese at the same time.”165 
E. CONCLUSION 
The preservation of a distinct Armenian identity was, and still is, of paramount 
importance to Armenians living in Lebanon. Works like that of Lebanese Armenian poet 
Mushegh Ishkhan’s “Lebanon: The Central Fortress of Culture in the Diaspora” even 
praise the distinctiveness of the Armenian community in Lebanon vis-à-vis the Armenian 
diaspora.166 The Lebanese confessional political system, even with all its weaknesses, 
offered the Armenians this much-desired opportunity to protect their culture. By pushing 
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Lebanese citizenship for Armenians to bolster the numbers of Christians in Lebanon, 
France laid the groundwork for the integration of Armenian refugees. Religion, however, 
did not stop the Armenians from reaching out to Lebanese Muslims even during the civil 
war. The “positive neutrality” policy adopted during the civil war best exemplifies the 
important role of the Armenians in the reconciliation of different Lebanese groups. 
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IV. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON 
Despite the cultural similarity between Palestinians and Lebanese, the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon find themselves living in isolation from the rest of the population. 
The Lebanese, segregated by sectarian and political affiliation, do not constitute a 
homogenous community, yet unanimously agree to exclude Palestinians from the 
mainstream Lebanese society. On one hand, the integration of Palestinian refugees 
threatens Lebanon’s political stability, which is based on a delicate balance among the 
different religious sects. On the other, the alignment of Lebanese and Palestinian views 
toward Israel requires the preservation of the Palestinians’ right of return to the lost 
homeland. Therefore, any effort to ease the condition of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
bizarrely constitutes a betrayal to the Palestinian cause. Without the necessary legal rights 
to participate in the social, economic, and political life, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
drift into a self-feeding loop of isolation. 
This chapter first traces the history of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It then 
examines the international legal response to the Palestinian refugee crisis. Later, the 
chapter outlines the legal status and rights of the Palestinians in Lebanon before the 
discussion ends by laying out the evolution of the Palestinian identity and its role in 
restraining the integration of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN 
LEBANON 
The Palestinian refugee problem remains “one of the intractable components of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict” that directly affects Lebanon.167 The formation of Israel and the 
subsequent 1948 Arab-Israeli war rendered thousands of Palestinians homeless.168 
During this early period of the conflict, approximately 128,000 Palestinian refugees 
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poured into neighboring southern Lebanon.169 This group of people and their 
descendants, today numbering 449,957, are registered with UNRWA in Lebanon.170 
Given the voluntary nature of registration and the massive migration of Palestinian 
refugees from Lebanon, this figure is only partially relevant when trying to identify the 
total number of Palestinians currently residing in the country.171  
Following the first Arab-Israeli war, three other events consolidated the 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon: the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and a coalition of 
Arab states, the 1970 “Black September” confrontation between Jordanian governmental 
forces and the Palestinian resistance organizations, and the ongoing conflict in Syria. 
After the military defeat of front line Arab regimes in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the 
occupation of additional Palestinian territories by Israel, 360,000 Palestinians forcefully 
relocated to neighboring countries, including Lebanon.172 Most of the Palestinians who 
moved to Lebanon during this period, however, were not eligible to register with 
UNRWA.173 Another group of Palestinian refugees who also did not register with 
UNRWA, and therefore are not included in UNRWA’s figures, arrived into Lebanon 
after Jordanian authorities attacked their camps in retaliation for Palestinian military 
activities in Jordan.174 
Ultimately, this confrontation resulted in the relocation of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) power base to Lebanon.175 After the Syrian conflict 
started in March 2011, UNRWA noticed the increased relocation of Palestine refugees 
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from Syria (PRS) to Lebanon. More than 53,070 PRS are estimated to have entered 
Lebanon during the first years of the Syrian conflict.176 In May 2014, however, Lebanese 
authorities implemented new measures to restrict their entry at the borders. The 
comprehensive headcount carried out by UNRWA confirms that, by December 2016, the 
number of PRS registered with UNRWA in Lebanon has decreased to 32,000.177  
The absence of reliable statistics has generated a wide range of conflicting 
speculation and estimates of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.178 Both the Palestinians 
and Lebanese authorities, though for different reasons, are inclined to adopt the highest 
estimates. In a bid for international sympathy, Palestinians tend to inflate their numbers 
to secure more humanitarian aid. The Lebanese authorities might also exaggerate their 
estimates to support their argument of Lebanon’s inability to absorb the Palestinian 
refugees without having massive repercussions to the Lebanese society. In 1994, for 
example, the Lebanese foreign minister estimated that some 400,000 to 500,000 
Palestinians resided in Lebanon.179 The Israelis, on the other hand, tend to adopt lower 
estimates to downgrade the importance of the Palestinian refugee problem in the Arab 
world.180 Despite the widely divergent estimates, a 2010 survey by the American 
University of Beirut pinpoints that, in addition to the Palestinian refugees who recently 
relocated from Syria, between 260,000 and 280,000 Palestinians are actual residents in 
Lebanon.181 
The lands that were temporarily designated to shelter the refugees after the first 
Arab-Israeli war have evolved over the years into permanent homes to the Palestinians. 
After more than six decades, a large percentage of the Palestinians in Lebanon still live in 
the remaining 12 UNRWA-registered camps in the country shown in Figure 5. This 62 
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percent constitutes the highest proportion of refugees in the world residing in camps.182 
The remaining 38 percent live in enclaves, mainly in the camp vicinity, that grew out of 
the displacements during the civil war.183 
 
Figure 5.  Official UNRWA Camps in Lebanon.184 
Nowadays, Palestinian camps are scattered all across Lebanon near major cities, 
as well as agricultural and industrial areas. In the early years, however, Palestinian 
refugees first settled in camps in southern Lebanon before moving to other allocated 
spaces.185 When the Palestinian refugee crisis first began, the international community 
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was not yet equipped to deal with the mass displacement of people. The Lebanese 
government, with the help of the Red Cross and religious authorities, provided assistance 
to the incoming refugees until the United Nations could secure financial and practical 
aid.186 
The Palestinian camps in Lebanon are considered “closed spaces” or islands 
located at the urban periphery. They have poor access, poor housing, and inadequate 
green spaces.187 Compounding the already difficult living conditions, the subsequent 
arrival of additional PRS increased the pressure on the waning infrastructure and services 
within the camps.188 A study conducted jointly by UNRWA and the American University 
of Beirut indicates that space is a major factor contributing to the social exclusion of 
Palestinians in Lebanon.189 This study compares several Palestinian communities living 
in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Gaza Strip, and the West Bank and confirms that the 
socio-economic situation of Palestinian refugees living within the “camps … is worse 
than that of those living outside the camps.”190 As shown in Figure 6, Palestinian 
refugees living in “closed spaces” are generally poorer than the local population. 
 
Figure 6.  Relationship between the Poverty Rate, Type of Camp, and 
Discrimination in the Labor market.191 
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In Lebanon, the situation is worse because of the discrimination in the labor market 
against Palestinians.  
The prevailing Lebanese perception of the Palestinian refugee camps is that they 
are zones of lawlessness within Lebanese sovereignty.192 Since Lebanese security forces 
do not enter the camps except to control the legal exits and entrances to the Palestinian 
camps, this view is understandable.193 Unlike Jordan, over the course of the civil war, 
Lebanon was unable to curb Palestinian military activities and witnessed security threats 
arising from the militarization of refugees. According to Lischer, one of the factors that 
explain the spread of civil wars arising from refugee flows is the receiving state’s ability 
to control militarism among refugees.194  
On the other hand, other scholars such as Muhammad Ali Khalidi and Diane 
Riskedahl argue that the Palestinian “camps are not the only parts of the country that 
have witnessed the occasional violent flareup.”195 This attempted justification of criminal 
activity and harboring of terrorists within the camps by alluding to other violent events in 
the country undermines the security of both the Palestinians and the Lebanese people. 
When fighting broke out in the Palestinian Nahr Al Barid camp on May 20, 2007, 
between the Lebanese Army and the terrorists who trained and lived within the refugee 
camp, 30,000 Palestinians suffered the consequences of the destruction of their homes.196  
B. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the early years of the conflict, the Palestinians expected the international 
community to restore their rights.197 Although they were presented with several 
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resettlement schemes, the Palestinians rejected all offers because such schemes would 
result in the refugees having to give up their claims to Palestine. Several months after the 
creation of the state of Israel, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that 
guarantees Palestinian refugees’ right of return or compensation as a basis for the 
solution of the problem. Resolution 194  
resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in 
peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of 
those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, 
under principles of international law, or in equity, should be made good by 
the Governments or authorities responsible.198 
Despite being undoubtedly the most significant piece of international legislation 
on Palestinian refugees, resolution 194 could not be implemented.199 When the 
international community failed to reach a political solution, the international response to 
the refugee crisis shifted its focus on improving the conditions of Palestinian refugees in 
host countries. The concentration on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis gained 
precedence when the UN General Assembly established UNRWA on December 8, 1949, 
to assist Palestinian refugees in the food, shelter, education, and health services.200  
The efforts undertaken by the international community to solve the Palestinian 
refugee crisis were not original. The UN was already engaged in finding a solution to the 
Europeans displaced by World War II, and just few days before establishing UNRWA, 
the UN General Assembly had established the UNHCR by adopting resolution 319 
(IV).201 On July 28, 1951, the first international refugee treaty, “Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees,” was signed in Geneva.202 The 1951 Convention, unlike 
UNRWA’s focus on Palestine refugees, is universal and applies to all those who became 
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refugees before January 1, 1951. The Arab states, on the other hand, feared that including 
the Palestinian refugees within the 1951 Convention would dilute their cause. Therefore, 
they proposed an amendment to exclude the refugees already under support from 
UNRWA. The same states, including Lebanon, however, that fought for the amendment 
to preserve the right of Palestinians, neither signed the 1951 Convention nor ratified it.203 
C. LEGAL STATUS OF PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 
Palestinian refugees have settled in Lebanon for more than 60 years, yet they hold 
a dubious legal position that contributes to their isolation from the Lebanese economic, 
political, and social structures.204 In theory, the international conventions that are 
officially recognized by Lebanon define the legal position of Palestinians in Lebanon. In 
practice, however, the Lebanese “sympathy and official support” for the Palestinian cause 
does not translate into a practical and legal framework protecting the individual rights of 
Palestinians.205 Based on their legal status and registration with UNRWA, Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon can be divided into four categories: 
1. “Registered” refugees, also known as “Palestine refugees,” who are 
registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese Department of Political and 
Refugees Affairs (DPRA); 
2. “Non-registered” Palestinian refugees, who are only registered with the 
Lebanese authorities have limited access to UNRWA’s services. Their 
estimated population is around 35,000; 
3. “Non-ID” Palestinian refugees, who are estimated to be between 3,000 to 
5,000 neither registered with UNRWA nor with the Lebanese authorities; 
and 
4. Palestine refugees from Syria, who arrived to Lebanon after 2011 and the 
Syrian conflict.206 
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Under the pretense of Lebanese sovereignty, Lebanese authorities issued several 
necessary laws to regulate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Adhering to the principle 
of sovereignty of each state to deal with its internal affairs, the international community 
also did not grant the UNRWA any powers to guarantee the security and legal rights of 
the Palestinian refugees in host countries. In December 1982, the Lebanese government 
insisted that the protection of the refugees was its responsibility: “Palestinians legally 
residing in Lebanese territory are under the protection of Lebanese law, as are Lebanese 
nationals and all foreigners legally residing in Lebanon.”207 This responsibility, however, 
does not extend to any of the humanitarian dimension assigned to UNRWA: “It must be 
made clear that the host Arab States are not ready to accept or to take over any of the 
UNRWA responsibilities, including education.”208  
Reluctant to adopt “any plan that could be interpreted as encouraging 
resettlement,” the Arab states insist on providing hospitality and protection on a 
temporary basis until a solution is found for the refugee problem.209 Furthermore, 
because of the dependency culture among refugees on international aid that was 
encouraged by UNRWA’s activities, any decline in UNRWA services in Lebanon can 
signal signs of abandonment by the international community. The Lebanese authorities 
fear that the decrease in international aid for the Palestinians would come at the expense 
of a solution that involves their permanent settlement in Lebanon. In this context, the 
deteriorating situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can only lead to an increase in 
discriminatory laws under the guise of protecting Palestinians’ right of return that is 
aimed to deny their ability to integrate within the Lebanese society. Such laws encourage 
Palestinians to leave Lebanon by applying “restrictive policies with regard to the social, 
economic, and civil rights of Palestinians.”210  
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One of the few areas of common ground between the various Lebanese political 
parties is their objection to granting citizenship for the Palestinians.211 The 1989 National 
Reconciliation Accord, Taif Agreement, signed at the end of the civil war explicitly 
rejected the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: “there shall be no 
fragmentation, partition, or settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon.”212 Lebanese 
Christian President Emile Lahoud emphasizes this point while addressing Beirut 
community leaders: “We cannot accept a settlement without … the sacred right of return 
of Palestinian refugees to their land.”213 Even the Sunnis in Lebanon, who theoretically 
would gain the most from naturalizing the predominantly Sunni Palestinian refugees, 
opposed any permanent settlement because it contradicts the Palestinian’s right of 
return.214 Strikingly, the Lebanese Shias expressed similar views: “First, regarding 
resettlement plans, we are with the rest of the Lebanese and with the rest of the 
Palestinians in rejecting resettlement plans although the Palestinians are our dear 
brothers.”215  
Nevertheless, Lebanese authorities naturalized many Palestinians over the course 
of the years. Approximately 50,000 Palestinian refugees, mostly Christians, received 
Lebanese citizenship during the 1950s and 1960s “to counter the rapidly growing Muslim 
population.”216 In 1994, the Lebanese authorities granted citizenship to another 27,000 
Muslim Palestinian refugees, mostly Shia residents in southern Lebanon. The others were 
Sunni Palestinians, probably naturalized “to balance out the Shia naturalization.”217 Few 
remaining Palestinian Christians then received Lebanon citizenship after the Maronites 
protested the naturalization of Muslim Palestinians.218  
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With the exception of these uncommon occurrences of naturalization of 
Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese government fiercely opposes granting citizenship to 
Palestinians. Without Lebanese citizenship, Palestinians are considered foreigners and, 
therefore, “excluded from several laws reserved for Lebanese citizens.”219 Since 
Lebanese consider the Palestinians no different from any other foreigners residing within 
Lebanon’s boundaries, Lebanese legislation concerning the Palestinian refugees reflects 
that view in the following sectors: residency rights, the right to work, the right to 
education, the right to own property, and citizenship rights.220 
The treatment of Palestinian residency in Lebanon continues to be equated with 
that of “foreigners, albeit of a ‘special kind’” after a revision to the original law that 
governs foreigners’ entry to, residency in, and exit from Lebanon to accommodate the 
Palestinians.221 A law promulgated in 1995 codified Lebanon’s extreme measures to 
reduce the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.222 In that same year, 5,000 Palestinian 
refugees from Lebanon were working abroad in Libya.223 Deliberately timed to coincide 
with Libya’s expulsion of its foreign workers, the promulgated law stipulated that “every 
Palestinian refugee who came to Lebanon in 1948 and who wishes to leave it, must 
obtain an exit and return visa from the Sûreté Générale.”224 Thousands of Palestinian 
refugees in Libya and elsewhere were stranded outside Lebanon because they could not 
apply for a return visa. Although the law was canceled five years later, approximately 
75,000 Palestinians lost their residency rights in Lebanon.225 
The law that governs Palestinian residency in Lebanon also forbids “the non-
Lebanese foreigner from engaging in any work or profession in Lebanon unless so 
licensed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in accordance with the laws and 
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rules and regulations in force.”226 Although the Lebanese authorities took small steps to 
allow Palestine refugees employment in previously prohibited private sectors, the 
principle of reciprocity still guides Lebanese labor law. Thus, the Lebanese authorities 
treat foreign workers in Lebanon in accordance with the rights given to Lebanese workers 
in each respective country. In this case, the stateless Palestinian refugees cannot work in 
job sectors that are subject to the reciprocity clause such as law, engineering, and 
others.227 They also cannot work in sectors that are restricted for Lebanese citizens, such 
as law, journalism, and even driving taxis.228 These restrictions in the job sector have 
tremendous consequences on the unemployment rate and socio-economic conditions of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. As of December 31, 2010, Palestine refugees had a 
staggering 56 percent unemployment rate.229 Considering the resulting socioeconomic 
challenges that affected the whole population after the arrival of Syrian refugees to 
Lebanon, poverty and unemployment among Palestine refugees could have yet increased 
since 2011.  
Not only does property law prevent Palestinians from legally acquiring property, 
but it also forbids them from inheriting real property or passing it to their descendants 
when they die.230 Once again under the pretense of upholding the Palestinian right of 
return, restrictions on property ownership are aimed at preventing the forced resettlement 
of Palestinians in Lebanon.231 The only remaining housing opportunities for Palestine 
refugees are limited to (1) overcrowded refugee camps; (2) unaffordable rentals outside 
the refugee camps; (3) or through informal and unprotected agreements with Lebanese 
associates.232 
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The complicated legal status of Palestinians in Lebanon has profoundly affected 
their treatment in several other sectors as well. Palestinian refugees have become 
dependent on “UNRWA as the sole provider of education, healthcare, and social 
services.”233 In the education sector, UNRWA has to run its own schools because of the 
restricted access for Palestinians to attend Lebanese schools.234 The high costs of higher 
education and restricted access to subsequent employment further limit the enrollment of 
Palestinians in Lebanese universities. In the healthcare sector, Palestinians also do not 
have easy access to the Lebanese public health facilities. Although UNRWA and other 
non-profit organizations provide some health services for Palestinian refugees, more 
funding is required to cover their growing health needs.235 
D. PALESTINIAN IDENTITY 
Over the course of the 20th century, the Palestinians experienced a series of 
identity transformations that eventually influenced their lives in Lebanon. In the early 
years of the century, Palestine constituted a part of the Ottoman Empire.236 Together with 
modern day Syria and Lebanon, the regions of Palestine were referred to as Greater 
Syria.237 The identity of most Muslim Arabs of Palestine at that time, as well as that of 
most Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, consisted of three shared and uniting characteristics: 
Arab ethnicity, Muslim religion, and Ottoman citizenship.238 In 1909, after the Young 
Turks rose to power and started promoting “Turkish rather than Islamic and Arab 
tradition,” a united Arab opposition based on a “common language, history, and culture” 
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spread in the Arab region of the Ottoman Empire.239 After the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire in World War I, this Arab identity, rather than the Palestinian Muslim or Ottoman 
identity, gained widespread support.240 
The shaping of the Palestinian identity coincided with the increased emigration of 
European Jews to Palestine. The British rule over Palestine and the intensified Jewish 
settlement led to a Palestinian Arab national movement that called for the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state.241 Palestinians perceived a growing attachment to 
Palestine quite different from that experienced under Ottoman rule; however, the 
traditional tribal and parochial identities hindered the formation of a truly national 
Palestinian identity. Therefore, Palestinians associated themselves more with the stronger 
religious and Arab identities rather than a Palestinian identity. The defeat of the Arab 
states in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war only strengthened the Palestinian commitment to the 
collective Arab identity. Rising Pan-Arabism, led by Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, gained significant momentum among Palestinian refugees. In 1957, Nasser had 
promised the return of Palestinian refugees and vowed to defeat Israel: “The refugees will 
not return while the flag of Israel flies over the soil of Palestine. They will return when 
the flag of Palestine is hoisted over Arab Palestine.”242 
For the Israelis, on the other hand, the only accepted solution was the resettlement 
of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states or elsewhere.243 Motivated by calls for Arab 
unity in the struggle against Israel and colonialism, many Palestinians considered the 
pan-Arab organizations prime advocates for their cause. Unsurprisingly in the first two 
decades after the 1948 war, Palestinians remained drawn to the salient uniting Arab 
identity.  
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon revealed the first indications of a growing loyalty 
to a distinct Palestinian identity. Coupled with their traumatic refugee experience, the 
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exclusion of Palestinians from the particular national identities growing in Lebanon and 
other host countries stimulated a surge in Palestinian national consciousness. Despite not 
being under Palestinian control, UNRWA’s schools in Lebanon constituted an important 
platform to disseminate ideas of a national belonging to Palestine. Moreover, several 
Palestinian national occasions served as opportunities to increase the students’ awareness 
of their identity. 
Following the first Arab-Israeli war and the failure of the Arab states in more than 
two decades to achieve their desired unity and liberate Palestine, a new perception for a 
much needed self-reliance and Palestinian identity intensified among refugees. Arab 
unity was no longer a foreseeable fundamental aspiration for the Palestinian cause. A 
realization among refugees that Palestine would be liberated only through Palestinian 
actions laid the foundation for the subsequent quick rise in Palestinian nationalism from 
1965 onward.244 This transformation from an exclusive pan-Arab identity is evident in 
the Palestinian National Pact of 1968 that incorporated new elements of Palestinian 
identity as well as the traditional pan-Arab and Muslim components.  
The expulsion of the PLO from Jordan to Lebanon had significant influence on 
the maturation and militarization of the Palestinian identity. From 1974 onward, 
Palestinian national unity based on armed struggle and popular resistance dominated the 
Palestinian political discourse in Lebanon.245 The PLO set out to expand its own military 
and social institutions. This Palestinian “state within a state” provided healthcare, 
education, and other social services to the refugees. Employing up to two thirds of the 
Palestinian labor force in Lebanon, the PLO developed a powerful economic presence 
and unmatched autonomous control over its own affairs.246 
Several other developments during this period further encouraged the 
commitment to Palestinian nationalism among refugees: 
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1. Unlike former Arab-Israeli conflicts, the October War of 1973 did not end 
with an overwhelming Israeli victory. This war restored the lost pride and 
self-confidence of the Palestinians after the destruction of the glory 
associated with the “unconquered Israeli army.” 
2. The acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly of the “PLO as 
an observer-member in the United Nations” legitimized the “wide 
international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people.”247 
3. The Palestinian opposition to the Camp David peace agreement between 
Egypt and Israel in 1978, which resulted in the withdrawal of Egypt from 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
4. The involvement of the Palestinians in the Lebanese civil war. 
5. The intensified Israeli attacks against Palestinian camps, and the Israeli 
invasion of South Lebanon in 1978 and 1982.248 
These developments solidly linked the Palestinian identity in Lebanon to the idea of 
Palestine as a homeland.249 Nevertheless, Palestinians in Lebanon, feeling betrayed and 
forgotten by their own people, denounced the actions of their leadership. The institutions 
that once expanded following the arrival of the Palestinian leadership in the 1970s closed 
after the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon. In addition, the PLO stopped most of its 
former financial assistance to the refugee camps.250 Another disappointment for the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon followed their exclusion from peace talks.251  Fearing a 
solution that would compromise their right of return, Palestinian refugees felt alienated 
from the struggle; however, the buildup of their Palestinian identity over the decades also 
meant that Lebanon could never be a substitute for Palestine. 
Bound by the right of return to Palestine, the Palestinian refugees resisted the 
development of a new integrated identity within the larger Lebanese society. The 
evolution of the Palestinian identity from a wider association with the united Arab 
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movement against Israel in the early days of the struggle to the more specific and 
exclusive Palestinian character constrained the patterns of personal adjustment acceptable 
by Palestinian refugees in their new Lebanese environment. Moreover, the life in the 
closed refugee camps influenced the forging, preserving, and amplifying of the 
Palestinian identity. The resemblance of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon to a 
microcosm of pre-1948 Palestine further deepened the rift between reality and nostalgia. 
Families once neighbors in the past went on being neighbors in Lebanon; thus, 
Palestinian refugees still perceive themselves as belonging to their lost villages in 
Palestine. This commitment, even if it is forced, to a destroyed past inhibits any required 
adjustment for the integration of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.252 
E. CONCLUSION 
The deteriorating socio-economic conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon have 
drawn attention to their isolation. Even worse, any peace agreement between the Arab 
States and Israel might not result in the Palestinians’ repatriation from Lebanon. The 
confessional nature of Lebanon’s political system has doomed the fate of Palestinians in 
the country. The primacy of religious communities in Lebanese society hampers any 
serious improvement in the legal status of Palestinians. Coupled with the legal and social 
restrictions in Lebanon, the international community’s inability to solve the political 
problem has created a culture of dependency among refugees. Despite the cultural 
similarities they share with Lebanese society, Palestinians retain a distinct identity that 
feeds on their isolation. Therefore, even if new laws were to make their lives bearable, 
the near future does not look promising for the integration of Palestinians in Lebanon. 
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V. COMPARING THE EXTENT OF ARMENIAN AND 
PALESTINIAN INTEGRATION IN LEBANON 
This chapter explores the difference in the degree of integration experienced by 
the Armenians and the Palestinians in Lebanon. First, the chapter briefly outlines 
Lebanon’s power sharing. There follows an analysis of each case using Ager and Strang’s 
conceptual framework that was introduced in the literature review. The chapter concludes 
by discussing the implications of this analysis. 
A. INTEGRATION OF ARMENIAN REFUGEES 
The application of Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework, as shown in Figure 
7, outlines the impact by the core domains of integration on the Armenian refugees in 
Lebanon. Five domains“Rights and Citizenship,” “Safety and Stability,” “Social 
Bonds,” “Employment,” and “Health”facilitated the integration of Armenian refugees 
in Lebanon. The remaining domains“Language and Cultural Knowledge,” “Social 
Bridges,” “Social Links,” “Housing,” and “Education”had a mixed impact. They 
played a less supporting role for integration but still were not powerfully isolating. 
 
Figure 7.  Integration of Armenians.253 
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The first favorable domain in the integration of Armenians is “Rights and 
Citizenship.” Armenians gained Lebanese citizenship under French pressure. Since then, 
they have only acquired more rights akin to other Lebanese groups. Ager and Strang have 
emphasized the role of “Citizenship and Rights” in the integration process of refugees. 
Accordingly, host countries should articulate clear policies on citizenship, and thus the 
rights granted to refugees.254 Lebanon evidently lacked a naturalization policy, but the 
extension of rights and benefits to Armenians accrued to them as Christians. The French 
desire to increase the numbers of their Christian allies encouraged granting Lebanese 
citizenship for Armenian refugees. Therefore, in this first major step toward the 
integration of Armenian refugees in Lebanon, religion played a decisive role.  
In the other five key components of the Armenians’ integration in Lebanon, 
“Employment” constitutes a distinguishing factor. Armenians successfully secured jobs 
in various sectors of the Lebanese market, though rarely working in the public sector. In a 
short time, they won the reputation in Lebanese society for their high quality industry and 
professional ethics.255 With a per capita income 40 percent higher than the average 
Lebanese national, Armenian notably contributed to the prospering Lebanese 
economy.256 With high qualifications and the ability to integrate within the labor market, 
the Armenians achieved remarkable economic autonomy and growth in Lebanon. 
Similarly, in the “Health” domain, Armenians did not face any difficulty, at least not 
more than any other Lebanese, in securing reliable access to health services. 
The “Safety and Stability” domain also facilitated the successful integration of 
Armenians. Armenian refugees considered Lebanon, despite its periods of civil strife, a 
safe place in comparison to their experience under Ottoman rule. The adoption of the 
“positive neutrality” position during the 1975 civil war brought them closer to the 
Muslim contingency in Lebanon. Although the “neutrality policy” helped minimize 
Armenian losses, it could not prevent them altogether. Still, the Armenian leaders 
successfully maintained a significantly stable environment for their community.  
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“Social Bonds” constitute another domain that assisted the integration of 
Armenians. Social connections with a “like-ethnic group” provide various contributing 
benefits to the integration of refugees.257 According to Ager and Strang, “such 
connection played [a] large part in them [refugees] feeling settled.”258 Unlike their 
established economic ties with the larger society, Armenians almost exclusively lived and 
interacted with other members of the Armenian community. These social bonds between 
the Armenians themselves guaranteed the protection of their distinct cultural and social 
identity and, therefore, the ability to integrate without becoming indistinguishable from 
the rest of the society. 
These same social bonds, however, had a negative impact on the remaining 
integration domains”Language and Cultural Knowledge,” “Social Bridges,” “Social 
Links,” “Housing,” and “Education.” The strong inter-ethnic connections weakened ties 
with other Lebanese groups“Social Bridges”and various structures of the Lebanese 
state“Social Links.” Moreover, Armenian refugees had neither the language nor the 
cultural knowledge of their new environment. The need for the Arabic language was 
unnecessary, explains one Armenian student: “I hardly use Arabic. But sometimes I have 
to use it to communicate with the Arabic teacher at our school.”259 Lack of language 
knowledge worsened the situation: “I avoid working with Arabs because my Arabic is 
very weak.”260 Still, Armenians shared with the Lebanese Christians some cultural and 
religious background. On the other hand, Armenians shared the experience of living 
under the Ottoman rule with the Muslims. 
The “Education” domain measures the accessibility of Armenian refugees to 
adequate education. Research on the integration of refugees with the host society stresses 
the importance of education in providing refugees the necessary skills to become self-
reliant and active members in that society.261 Since its formation, the Lebanese 
                                                 
257 Ager and Strang, “Understanding Integration,” 178. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Jebejian, “Patterns of Language Use among Armenians,” 460. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ager and Strang, “Understanding Integration,” 172. 
 62 
educational system was distinctive in the Armenian diaspora, but this positive impact 
contrasts with other negative elements in the education of Armenians in Lebanon. In the 
latter part of the 19th Century, for instance, major higher education institutions such as 
the American University of Beirut (AUB) and Saint Joseph University (USJ) served 
Lebanon’s pre-Genocide Armenian community.262 With the large influx of Armenian 
refugees after the Genocide; however, the majority chose to send their children to 
Armenian academic institutions. 
Schools allow contact between refugees and members of the host community and 
help establish relationships that favor integration.263 Theoretically, Armenians can attend 
any school, but they have stressed the role of their own academic institutions in 
maintaining the Armenian identity: “The Armenian school is the home of the 
Armenian.”264 Armenians opened their own schools, first, in refugee camps and, later, in 
the expanding Armenian neighborhoods.265 By 1948, 59 Armenian schools had opened in 
Lebanon to serve nearly 11,000 pupils.266 Jemaran, the secondary school founded by 
Nikol Aghbalian the Dashnak activist and educator, became “the premier educational 
institution in the Armenian diaspora.”267 The Armenian community in Lebanon also 
established Haigazian University, the “only institution of higher learning in the Armenian 
diaspora.”268 The Armenian community in Lebanon, therefore, had ample access to 
education, but remained isolated from the rest of the Lebanese society by attending 
Armenian schools. 
In a similar vein, the “Housing” domain evaluates the housing conditions of 
Armenians in Lebanon. According to Ager and Strang, refugees are more concerned with 
the social and cultural impact of housing than the actual physical qualities of 
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residences.269 Living in an ethnically homogenous community helps refugees feel 
“settled.”270 Up to this present day, the Armenians in Lebanon are concentrated in 
neighborhoods heavily populated by Armenians. Bourj Hammoud, the traditional 
Armenian stronghold in Beirut, is even known as “Little Armenia.”271 Although living in 
like-ethnic neighborhoods facilitated integration, it also led to the isolation of Armenian 
refugees: “I live in Bourj Hammoud where my neighbors are Armenians. Actually, once 
all my neighbors were Armenian … I am happy that I stayed here where my grocer and 
butcher are Armenian.”272 In their framework, Ager and Strang actually encourage 
refugees to maintain strong relationships with other refugees. They also stress the 
positive role of “ethnic enclaves,” but they fail to establish what the ideal conditions 
should be.273 Should refugees interact exclusively with like-ethnic individuals? When 
does this interaction become an isolating factor? 
In a country different from Lebanon and with a refugee group other than the 
Armenians, the conditions in the “Language and Cultural Knowledge,” “Social Bridges,” 
“Social Links,” “Housing,” and “Education” domains could have led to the isolation of 
the refugee community. Armenians, on the other hand, were skeptical of any efforts that 
would affect their identity and result in total assimilation. Armenians felt safer to 
integrate in a country where they could maintain autonomous control over their own 
affairs. 
B. INTEGRATION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 
The Palestinians have been refugees for more than six decades now. Yet, they 
remain isolated from Lebanon’s host communities. Figure 8 shows the application of 
Ager and Strang’s framework to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Only two 
domains“Social Bonds” and “Language and Cultural Knowledge”supported the 
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integration of Palestinians in Lebanon. The conditions of the remaining domains strongly 
resulted in the isolation of the Palestinian refugees. 
  
Figure 8.  Integration of Palestinians.274 
Of the two domains favoring integration, “Language and Cultural Knowledge” 
demonstrates a stronger impact because of the cultural similarities between the 
Palestinian and Lebanese people. According to Ager and Strang, “being able to speak the 
main language of the host community is, for example, consistently identified as central to 
the integration process.”275 The ability to speak the same language gave Palestinians 
some minor advantages. They easily interacted with the Lebanese host communities, and 
unlike the Armenians, Palestinians did not have to adjust to an alien culture. 
Palestinian refugees also share similar religious backgrounds with the Lebanese 
people. Simon Haddad, professor of political science at the Notre Dame University in 
Lebanon, has researched one important question: “How do the Lebanese view [a] Palestinian 
presence in their country?”276 The results of the study, shown in Figure 9, indicate that 
Lebanese groups, with the exception of Sunnis and Druze, display little warmth toward 
Palestinians. On the other hand, Lebanese Sunni Muslims exhibit the highest levels of 
warmth toward Palestinians, in which the majority are Sunni Muslims as well. 
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Figure 9.  Relations between Religious Background and Communal 
Closeness/Hostility to Palestinians (N=716).277 
Religion, however, was a double-edged sword. On one hand, Lebanese 
Christians’ and Muslims’ solidarity with their Palestinian counterparts helped the 
refugees settle in Lebanon after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. On the other hand, Maronites 
were concerned about the predominantly Sunni Muslim Palestinian presence and its 
destabilizing nature in Lebanon’s “precarious sectarian balance, on whose basis Maronite 
supremacy was founded.”278 
The second domain favoring integration of Palestinians is what Ager and Strang 
call “Social Bonds.” Like the Armenians, Palestinians preserved their ties with other 
members of their community. The “closed” Palestinian camps certainly played an 
important role in keeping these “Social Bonds” strong. Moreover, Palestinians 
maintained familiar patterns of relationships by reassembling village and family units in 
camps. The connections with “like-ethnic groups” helped Palestinians get accustomed to 
their new lives in Lebanon. More importantly, these ties strengthened the Palestinian 
identity and “created contact points for isolated individuals.”279  
Similar to the Armenians, the Palestinians’ strong inter-ethnic ties contrast with 
the other “Social Connect” domains. While Palestinians interacted with members of their 
own community, they were definitely cut off from the rest of the Lebanese 
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society“Social Bridges”and governmental institutions“Social Links.” 
Accordingly, the survey data in Figure 10 suggests that roughly 20 percent of the 
Lebanese population had personal contacts with Palestinians. 
 
Figure 10.  Frequency of Contact with Palestinians Based on 
Religious Background (N=1046).280 
Once again, religion is related to the degree of contact between members of 
Lebanese groups and Palestinian refugees. Lebanese Christians, in general, and 
Maronites specifically had the least interaction with Palestinians. On the other hand, 
Lebanese Sunnis interacted the most with Palestinians. These results are understandable 
and even expected because most of the Palestinians who came in 1948 settled near or 
inside Sunni enclaves.281 
Contrary to the Armenians in Lebanon, the majority of Palestinian refugees did 
not obtain Lebanese citizenship. In some rare cases, Lebanese authorities naturalized 
several thousands of Palestinians balanced out among different religious sects.282 Still, 
the opposition to Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon comes from all spectrums of 
society.283 Lebanese political parties even accuse each other of promoting 
naturalization.284 In this regard, the popular perception has been consistent: (1) the 
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naturalization of Palestinian refugees would upset the delicate balance between Lebanese 
Christians and Muslims; (2) and negate the refugees’ right to return to Palestine.285 
The refugees themselves have also insisted on the right of return to Palestine. 
Brigadier Sultan Abu al-Aynayn, the Palestine Authority representative in Lebanon, 
explains: “I have not fought 30 years of my life to stay here … Although I love Lebanon, 
why should I take up Lebanese nationality? If one hundred thousand Palestinians are 
made to stay here, I can’t guarantee they won’t fight their way out.”286 A large majority 
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon share the sentiments of Brigadier Abu al-Aynayn. As 
Figure 11 demonstrates, a total of 57 and 79 percent Palestinian respondents to a survey, 
respectively, rejected the options of citizenship and permanent settlement in Lebanon. 
 
Figure 11.  Probing Alternatives for Resolving the Palestinian Problem.287 
The restrictions on Palestinians have extended to the legal rights and protections 
that the Lebanese state affords its citizens. Poor housing and living conditions; negligible 
access to public education, health, and social services; and high rates of unemployment 
clearly hamper the integration of Palestinians. Understandably, the vast majority of 
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Palestinian “respondents score low on the socio-economic satisfaction items” in 
Haddad’s survey, as shown in Figure 12.288 
 
Figure 12.  Socio-economic Satisfaction Items.289 
The poor socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are the 
result of deliberate actions by the Lebanese government, which regards the Palestinians 
“neither as nationals nor foreigners but simply as non-nationals.”290 A restrictive policy 
of “strangulation,” as it is referred to by Palestinians, limits their ability to find work and 
own property.291 Therefore, in terms of “Employment,” “Housing,” “Education,” and 
“Health” domains, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are subject to discriminatory 
policies that reinforce their isolation.  
In the “Safety and Stability” domain, the Lebanese authorities were unsuccessful 
in removing any barriers that inhibit the participation of Palestinian refugees in the 
mainstream society. As reported by Ager and Strang, “refugees often indicated that if 
they did not feel physically safe in an area they could not feel integrated.”292 For the first 
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few years after the arrival of Palestinians in 1948, and until 1958, the Lebanese regime 
took positive steps to support the safety and stability of refugees. After 1958, however, 
the Lebanese authorities pressured the Palestinians by initiating aggressive policies 
against them.293 The Palestinians in Lebanon were not blameless either. From southern 
Lebanon, the PLO attacked Israel, which in its turn retaliated and even launched 
preemptive raids against Palestinian targets.294 When the civil war erupted in 1975, 
radical Palestinian groups sided with left-wing Muslim militias against Christian right-
wing factions.295 This hostile environment in Lebanon, therefore, did not facilitate the 
integration of Palestinian refugees. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The two cases provide support for the argument that religious affiliation can 
infringe on political and even humanitarian decisions, which affects the integration of 
refugees in Lebanon. Their religious identity as Christians played an important role in the 
decision to naturalize the Armenians and, thus, their integration. In the Palestinian case, 
in which most refugees are Sunni Muslims, preserving the sectarian balance in Lebanese 
society has been of upmost importance to the government. Figure 13 summarizes the 
analysis of the two cases using Ager and Strang’s framework but adds a new component, 
religion that could affect all other domains as well:  
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Figure 13.  Domains of Integration. 
The Armenian case study also suggests that although having language and 
cultural knowledge of the host society is important for successful integration, refugees 
want to preserve their own culture. Probably, one of the few positive points about the 
Lebanese political system’s encouragement of strong communal attachments is that it fit 
with the expectations of Armenians to take care of their own affairs. The evolution of 
their identity to include a Lebanese element contrasts with that of the Palestinians who 
even felt that they did not belong to Palestine anymore, but only to the camps in which 
they live. 
More broadly, many European countries have taken a hardline position against the 
flow of refugees from the Middle East. Danish historian Bo Lidegaard expresses an 
attitude that many in other countries share, “We are a multiethnic society today, and we 
have to realize itbut we are not and should never become a multicultural society.”296 
With similar themes erupting across Europe, a Pew research study found that “Europeans 
do not see growing diversity as making their countries better.”297 The Armenian and 
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Palestinian cases in Lebanon suggest that successful integration is not affected by the 
refugees’ cultural or ethnic traits in general but primarily by their religious affiliation. 
The increasing divisions along religious lines, therefore, will inhibit the integration of 
thousands of refugees. 
 72 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Lebanon now hosts the largest refugee population per capita in the world.298 By 
January 2015, the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon exceeded a quarter of that 
nation’s original population of 4.4 million.299 This burgeoning influx numbers of 
refugees into Lebanon has placed host communities under enormous pressure. Figure 14 
shows the most vulnerable regions in Lebanon, in which both Lebanese and refugee 
communities face economic deprivation. The UNHCR reports that more than a million 
Lebanese people are now vulnerable and require immediate assistance.300 
 
Figure 14.  Most Vulnerable Regions.301 
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The Lebanese government, however, has no clear strategy to respond to the crisis. 
In those early years of the Syrian conflict, Lebanon adopted an “open door” policy that 
allowed the entry of any Syrian into the country. Many believe this policy was the result 
of the political stalemate in the country rather than any deliberate response by the 
Lebanese government.302 In October 2014, the government revised its policy to limit and 
even stop the flow of Syrians into Lebanon. The contradictory Lebanese responses to the 
refugee crisis have left the situation in Lebanon at the verge of exploding. 
Violence spilling over from the conflict in Syria threatens Lebanon’s delicate 
stability. In 2014, terrorists affiliated with ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra clashed with the 
Lebanese Armed Forces in the border town of Arsal, a key refugee hub.303 Although the 
military operations swiftly restored order to this town holding some 20,000 Syrian 
refugees, the situation in Arsal, and in Lebanon in general, is still of concern.304 In the 
same year, terrorists conducted 14 car bombings or suicide attacks in various Lebanese 
regions, killing 11 people.305 The battle in Arsal alarmed both the domestic and 
international communities and raised concerns about security threats associated with 
unmanaged refugee flows. Likewise, Europe faces similar, if not more serious, threats 
arising from admitting Syrian refugees. Although no concrete evidence exists to prove 
that terrorists “systematically use the flow of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed,” two 
perpetrators of the November 13 Paris terrorist attacks had arrived on the European 
continent through Greece as part of the large influx of refugees from Syria.306 Most 
Syrians fleeing their country are searching for relative safety, but their living and social 
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conditions after they arrive in their host country significantly influence their future 
behavior. The successful integration of Syrian refugees, therefore, becomes a security 
necessity to mitigate any risk of their radicalization. 
This chapter applies the lessons learned from the Armenian and Palestinian case 
studies to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. The chapter uses the same conceptual 
framework that was applied in the analysis of each case study to provide 
recommendations for the integration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. 
A. INTEGRATION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES 
The Syrian refugee crisis poses major differences from the two case studiesthe 
integration of Armenian and Palestinian refugeespresented earlier. Syrian refugees 
actually have a chance of returning to Syria once the conflict ends whereas the situation 
of both Palestinians and Armenians is more complicated. From the beginning of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the chances that Palestinian refugees could actually go back to their 
homes looked bleak. Yet, for more than six decades, Lebanese authorities have treated 
their residency in Lebanon as temporary. Even the international community has handled 
the Palestinian refugee problem as a momentary situation. Scholar Michael Kagan writes 
that “Every year, the General Assembly goes through the ritual of noting ‘with regret that 
the [United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine] UNCCP has been unable to 
find means of achieving progress’ in implementing Resolution 194’s provisions for 
refugee return and compensation, and then asks the UNCCP ‘to continue exerting efforts’ 
and ‘to report’ the following year.”307 Similarly, in the Armenian case, the treaties 
between the Allies and Turkey destroyed the prospect of having an independent 
homeland that the Armenian refugees in Lebanon could return to after World War I 
ended. The resolution of the Syrian conflict, on the other hand, can help ease the refugee 
crisis in Lebanon, but Lebanese authorities should not repeat the mistake of considering 
the situation temporary and enforce strict restrictions as it did with the Palestinian 
refugees. Instead, Lebanese authorities should treat the whole integration process of 
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Syrian refugees as a transitory stage, one that can benefit both Lebanese and Syrian 
communities. 
(1) Rights and Citizenship 
Apparently granting the Syrian refugees Lebanese citizenship is out of the 
question; according to one survey, 80 percent of Lebanese people in some areas believe 
that the mere presence of Syrians threatens the sectarian balance.308 This figure, however, 
should not stop the Lebanese government from according Syrians in the country some 
political representation even if only at the municipal level. The analysis of the Armenian 
case study shows that after the Armenian community was accorded political 
representation in the parliament, its representatives were able to voice its specific needs, 
including employment, education, housing, and healthcare. The Lebanese authorities, 
therefore, should guarantee the Syrian refugees a representative number of political seats 
like any other minority in the country. The political quota afforded to the Syrians, 
however, should not come at the expense of other groups in the country but under a 
separate and temporary system. 
(2) Language and Cultural Knowledge  
The Syrians are not culturally different from the Lebanese host communities. In 
addition, they can interact easily with the Lebanese population. The Armenian and 
Palestinian case studies indicate that the refugees are interested in preserving some of 
their unique cultural characteristics. A possible course of action in this case is to 
introduce history lessons about Syria in the education of refugees. This academic 
framework would contribute to sustaining the Syrian identity in future generations.  
(3) Safety and Stability  
The Lebanese authorities should take into serious consideration the creation of a 
safe and stable environment not only for Syrian refugees but also for the Lebanese 
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population. The whole security apparatus in Lebanon, including the Lebanese Armed 
Forces, is fighting terrorism on a daily basis. Terrorist arrests show that Syrian refugees 
have been increasingly prone to radicalization. Some municipalities have implemented a 
series of restrictions including curfews on Syrian refugees. These regulations, however, 
tend to isolate the Syrians from the rest of the Lebanese population without achieving any 
considerable improvements. One study has found that, in Lebanon, “as many as 91 
percent of host communities believe that the presence of displaced Syrians poses a 
security threat to them.”309 Alarmingly, this figure nearly echoes the same sentiments 
toward the Palestinian refugees. The negative stigma that contributed to the isolation of 
the Palestinian refugees should not be expanded to include the Syrians in Lebanon. 
Therefore, the Lebanese government should enact new laws that protect Syrian refugees 
from racial profiling by law enforcement agencies. This approach builds a trusting 
relationship between the Syrians and the Lebanese security forces. The Palestinian case 
study also showed that isolated Palestinian refugees were particularly prone to embrace 
jihadist ideologies. Therefore, the Lebanese authorities should collaborate with religious 
leaders to correct any misinterpretations of Islam in vulnerable Syrian refugee 
communities.  
(4) Social Bridges 
Several factors affect the social connections between Lebanese host communities 
and the Syrian refugees living within those communities. The initial warmth toward 
Syrian refugees has changed over time mainly because of the intensified labor 
competition, especially in low-end jobs. The Syrian refugees are already receiving direct 
aid from international organizations and, therefore, are willing to accept lower wages 
than the rest of the population.310 This increased job competition has created hostility 
between the locals and the Syrian refugees. In addition, the curfews imposed by many 
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municipalities deepen the rift between the refugees and host communities. Therefore, to 
enhance the social connections between host and refugee communities, the recommended 
strategy should address these underlying causes of hostility. First, aid from international 
organizations should also target the vulnerable Lebanese population as well. Second, the 
Lebanese government should develop the rural areas where many of the vulnerable 
population live. A possible course of action, in this case and one that is much needed 
nowadays, is to develop a new civilian airport in the northern region of Lebanon. This 
and other public utilities could employ a large number of Lebanese people and, thus, ease 
the job competition with the Syrian refugees. Finally, the government should prohibit the 
illegal curfews in local municipalities that increase the tensions between the two 
communities. 
(5) Social Bonds  
Given their large numbers in Lebanon, the Syrians face no difficulty having in-
group connections with other members of their refugee communities. These ties, 
however, seem to fall along sectarian lines similar to the ones that drive the conflict in 
Syria. Therefore, Lebanese authorities should sponsor workshops that promote dialogue 
and conflict prevention among Syrian groups of different religions. The Syrian leaders in 
Lebanon, like the Armenian leaders who resisted inter-communal violence, bear a huge 
responsibility in mending their internal rifts. In a similar vein to the international peace 
talks between the Syrian opposition and the regime, the Lebanese government should 
promote a neutral venue where the Syrians can agree that eventually they would have to 
live side-by-side peacefully. First, the Lebanese authorities should lay the foundation of 
this policy by convincing the Syrian community leaders of the importance of intra-
communal dialogue. For the Syrians, this step is very important as it would legitimize 
such workshops. Then, with the approval of the Syrian leaders, these workshops should 
primarily target the youth of various groups within the Syrian refugee communities in 
Lebanon. 
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(6) Social Links   
The ties between refugees and Lebanese governmental institutions in general are 
profoundly affected by the ability of local municipalities to provide some basic services. 
As previously noted, the Palestinian refugees live in isolated closed camps and barely 
receive any services from the Lebanese public sector. The need for increased “Social 
Links” is even higher in the case of Syrian refugees that are spread all across the country 
without being confined to refugee camps. Even before the Syrian refugee crisis, however, 
local municipalities faced major challenges: “70 percent of municipalities were too small 
to provide basic services pre-crisis, 57 percent lacked an administrative structure, and 40 
percent had only a single employee (often working on a part-time or voluntary basis).”311 
The Lebanese government, therefore, should allocate more funds for training, staffing, 
and equipping local municipalities to serve the needs of Syrian refugees. This approach 
grants the Syrian refugees enhanced access to governmental services that was lacking in 
the case of Palestinians in Lebanon. This approach helps strengthen the links between 
local authorities and the communities they serve, and thereby promotes the successful 
integration of Syrian refugees.  
(7) Education 
The influx of Syrian refugees has exerted enormous pressure on the Lebanese 
educational system, “not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of variety of needs 
and impact on the quality of the education system.”312 The Ministry of Education and 
Higher Education (MEHE) introduced several important measures to provide Syrian 
children with formal education. In 2014, for example, MEHE initiated the “Reaching All 
Children with Education” (RACE) plan to increase the number of Syrian children with 
access to education.313 The program “allowed refugees to enroll in school without 
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providing proof of legal residency, waived school enrollment fees, and opened up 
afternoon ‘second shift’ classes in 238 public schools to provide Syrians with formal 
education.”314 Despite all the domestic effort and international support, more than half of 
“school aged refugees [remained] out of formal education” during the school year 2016–
2017.315 
 
Figure 15.  Lebanon Crisis Response – Education.316  
To address this critical issue, integration policy proposed in this thesis suggests 
some major reforms and temporary measures to the Lebanese educational system. In both 
the Armenian and Palestinian case studies, the refugees benefited from having an 
education that stressed the preservation of their identity. The Palestinian case study, 
however, reveals that in the education sector, the Palestinians were highly dependent on 
UNRWA whereas the Armenians were more autonomous. Also, the Palestinians were not 
enthusiastic about getting an education because it would not help them secure a job later. 
Therefore, first, it is recommended that MEHE temporarily allow non-formal education 
to Syrian children. Second, qualified Syrian teachers should be central to this plan. They 
could provide education for the most vulnerable refugees who cannot attend public 
schools. This approach breaks the dependency on Lebanese and international aid and 
promotes the preservation of the Syrian identity. Lastly, the Lebanese authorities should 
present a clear roadmap that details the legal pathways for Syrians into the labor market. 
This roadmap would serve as an incentive for Syrian refugees to continue their education. 
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(8) Housing 
The Lebanese authorities have refused to allow the building of refugee camps to 
house the Syrian refugees. Many refer to Lebanon’s bad experience with the Palestinian 
camps to support their refusal for new camps.317 UNHCR’s numbers, shown in Figure 
16, reveal that the majority of Syrian refugees live in bad housing conditions. 
 
Figure 16.  Lebanon Crisis Response – Shelter.318 
The Armenian and Palestinian case studies, however, reveal that refugees are 
affected more by the social aspect of housing than the physical qualities. One positive 
outcome of the Lebanese refusal to build new camps is the increased interaction that 
results between the Lebanese host communities and the refugees. Many Syrian refugees 
would agree with this decision as well. Landlords, however, have taken advantage of the 
increased demand for housing to raise rents, thus affecting both Lebanese and Syrian 
communities. Therefore, it is recommended that Lebanese authorities empower local 
municipalities to oversee and prevent any unjustified hike in rent. 
(9) Employment 
Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese economy suffered from high 
unemployment and poverty rates.319 The World Bank estimated that the “Lebanese 
economy needs to create six times as many jobs simply to absorb the regular market 
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entrants.”320 The influx of Syrian refugees has only aggravated the economic challenges 
by increasing the workforce that competes for low-skilled jobs.321 In addition, the 
International Labor Organization estimates that 90 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
work without a formal contract.322 One lesson learned from the Armenian case study is 
that excellence in the employment sector would promote refugees’ self-reliance and 
increase their contact with Lebanese business owners. Another lesson learned from the 
Palestinian case study is that economic deprivation increases the isolation of refugees. 
The response to the crisis should include creating the necessary laws that would regulate 
informal Syrian labor and guarantee social protection for employed refugees. More 
importantly, the Lebanese authorities should allow Syrians to open their own businesses 
as it would create more jobs for the refugees.  
(10) Health 
The Lebanese health sector could play an important role in the integration of the 
Syrian refugees. As shown in Figure 17, UNHCR reports that as many as 16 percent of 
Syrian refugees could not access primary healthcare in the last six months.  
 
Figure 17.  Lebanon Crisis Response – Health.323 
A major contributor to the isolation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is their 
increasingly poor healthcare coverage. Similarly, many Syrians prefer relocating to a 
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third country or even going back to Syria just to have better access to health services. The 
refugee integration policy, therefore, should address, at a minimum, the basic health 
needs of Syrians in Lebanon. The Palestinian case study provides a guideline to follow. 
Funding from international donors should help establish a nationwide network of primary 
healthcare facilities that are not reserved only for the Syrian refugees. This way the 
Lebanese host communities could regard the Syrian refugees as beneficial rather than just 
a cost to bear. This approach breaks the high dependency on expensive privatized 
healthcare facilities that threatens all vulnerable populations. The Lebanese Ministry of 
Health should assign each public healthcare facility doctors that can treat post-traumatic 
stress disorder or any other refugee-related medical condition.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the Lebanese popular perception, the presence of Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon can benefit the country by bringing in much needed resources and development 
projects. The international community has already poured millions of dollars into 
Lebanon to finance the UNHCR mission in Lebanon, though the funds received only 
amount to 8 percent of the total appeal.324 The international community, therefore, should 
take a larger role in facilitating the integration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The 
recommendations advanced in this chapter address both the Lebanese government and 
refugee community because the Syrians also have an important responsibility in the 
integration process. On this matter, the Armenian case offers an important observation. 
During the civil war, the Armenians transcended their religious affiliation to reach out to 
other constituents in Lebanon. This lesson, applied to the Syrian refugees, means that 
they should distance themselves from the internal Lebanese divisions. If they follow this 
trajectory, the Syrian refugees could dissipate the fear that accompanies their presence in 
Lebanon. 
Lebanon has always been a safe haven for persecuted people and minorities. Its 
religious diversity and freedom also distinguish it from many other Middle Eastern 
                                                 
324 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, LCPR 2017 Quarter 1 Funding Update, 
(Beirut: Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, March 31, 2017), 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13350. 
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countries. The Lebanese people learned, the hard way, that there is no other way but for 
the various religious minorities to live together in harmony. Moreover, the Muslim 
factions in the country, at first, opposed the integration of Armenians in Lebanon; 
however, they experienced, together with their Christian partners, the benefits of this 
successful integration. With the proper strategies, therefore, the Lebanese government 
can promote the successful integration of Syrian refugees and further contribute to 
Lebanon’s unique diversity. 
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